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1. Moral philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated
after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and
may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of
mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as in-
fluenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object,
and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem
to possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves.
As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species
of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all
helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy
and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the imagination,
and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations
and instances from common life; place opposite characters in a proper
contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory
and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts
and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the difference be-
tween vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and so
they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they
think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.
2. The other species of philosophers considers man in the light of a
reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavours to form his un-
derstanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature
as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in
order to find those principles, which regulate our understanding, excite
our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object,
action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that phi-
losophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation6/David Hume
of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and should for ever talk of truth and
falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to
determine the source of these distinctions. While they attempt this ardu-
ous task, they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from par-
ticular instances to general principles, they still push on their enquiries
to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those
original principles, by which, in every science, all human curiosity must
be bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract, and even unintel-
ligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned
and the wise; and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labour
of their whole lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may
contribute to the instruction of posterity.
3. It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always,
with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate
and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agree-
able, but more useful than the other. It enters more into common life;
moulds the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles which
actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that model
of perfection which it describes. On the contrary, the abstruse philoso-
phy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into business
and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes
into open day; nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our
conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our
passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its conclusions,
and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian.
4. This also must be confessed, that the most durable, as well as
justest fame, has been acquired by the easy philosophy, and that ab-
stract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary repu-
tation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been
able to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is easy for
a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile reasonings;
and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he pushes on
his consequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion,
by its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a
philosopher, who purposes only to represent the common sense of man-
kind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he
falls into error, goes no farther; but renewing his appeal to common
sense, and the natural sentiments of the mind, returns into the right path,
and secures himself from any dangerous illusions. The fame of CiceroEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/7
flourishes at present; but that of Aristotle is utterly decayed. La Bruyere
passes the seas, and still maintains his reputation: But the glory of
Malebranche is confined to his own nation, and to his own age. And
Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when Locke shall be en-
tirely forgotten.
The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly but little
acceptable in the world, as being supposed to contribute nothing either
to the advantage or pleasure of society; while he lives remote from com-
munication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions
equally remote from their comprehension. On the other hand, the mere
ignorant is still more despised; nor is anything deemed a surer sign of an
illiberal genius in an age and nation where the sciences flourish, than to
be entirely destitute of all relish for those noble entertainments. The
most perfect character is supposed to lie between those extremes; re-
taining an equal ability and taste for books, company, and business;
preserving in conversation that discernment and delicacy which arise
from polite letters; and in business, that probity and accuracy which are
the natural result of a just philosophy. In order to diffuse and cultivate
so accomplished a character, nothing can be more useful than composi-
tions of the easy style and manner, which draw not too much from life,
require no deep application or retreat to be comprehended, and send
back the student among mankind full of noble sentiments and wise pre-
cepts, applicable to every exigence of human life. By means of such
compositions, virtue becomes amiable, science agreeable, company in-
structive, and retirement entertaining.
Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from science his
proper food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human
understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular,
either from the extent of security or his acquisitions. Man is a sociable,
no less than a reasonable being: But neither can he always enjoy com-
pany agreeable and amusing, or preserve the proper relish for them.
Man is also an active being; and from that disposition, as well as from
the various necessities of human life, must submit to business and occu-
pation: But the mind requires some relaxation, and cannot always sup-
port its bent to care and industry. It seems, then, that nature has pointed
out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to the human race, and secretly
admonished them to allow none of these biasses to draw too much, so as
to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge
your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human, and8/David Hume
such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse
thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will severely punish, by
the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty
in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pre-
tended discoveries shall meet with, when communicated. Be a philoso-
pher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.
5. Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the easy phi-
losophy to the abstract and profound, without throwing any blame or
contempt on the latter, it might not be improper, perhaps, to comply
with this general opinion, and allow every man to enjoy, without oppo-
sition, his own taste and sentiment. But as the matter is often carried
farther, even to the absolute rejecting of all profound reasonings, or
what is commonly called metaphysics, we shall now proceed to con-
sider what can reasonably be pleaded in their behalf.
We may begin with observing, that one considerable advantage,
which results from the accurate and abstract philosophy, is, its subser-
viency to the easy and humane; which, without the former, can never
attain a sufficient degree of exactness in its sentiments, precepts, or
reasonings. All polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in
various attitudes and situations; and inspire us with different sentiments,
of praise or blame, admiration or ridicule, according to the qualities of
the object, which they set before us. An artist must be better qualified to
succeed in this undertaking, who, besides a delicate taste and a quick
apprehension, possesses an accurate knowledge of the internal fabric,
the operations of the understanding, the workings of the passions, and
the various species of sentiment which discriminate vice and virtue. How
painful soever this inward search or enquiry may appear, it becomes, in
some measure, requisite to those, who would describe with success the
obvious and outward appearances of life and manners. The anatomist
presents to the eye the most hideous and disagreeable objects; but his
science is useful to the painter in delineating even a Venus or an Helen.
While the latter employs all the richest colours of his art, and gives his
figures the most graceful and engaging airs; he must still carry his at-
tention to the inward structure of the human body, the position of the
muscles, the fabric of the bones, and the use and figure of every part or
organ. Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to beauty, and just
reasoning to delicate sentiment. In vain would we exalt the one by de-
preciating the other.
Besides, we may observe, in every art or profession, even thoseEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/9
which most concern life or action, that a spirit of accuracy, however
acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfection, and renders them
more subservient to the interests of society. And though a philosopher
may live remote from business, the genius of philosophy, if carefully
cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout the whole
society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and calling. The
politician will acquire greater foresight and subtility, in the subdividing
and balancing of power; the lawyer more method and finer principles in
his reasonings; and the general more regularity in his discipline, and
more caution in his plans and operations. The stability of modern gov-
ernments above the ancient, and the accuracy of modern philosophy,
have improved, and probably will still improve, by similar gradations.
6. Were there no advantage to be reaped from these studies, beyond
the gratification of an innocent curiosity, yet ought not even this to be
despised; as being one accession to those few safe and harmless plea-
sures, which are bestowed on the human race. The sweetest and most
inoffensive path of life leads through the avenues of science and learn-
ing; and whoever can either remove any obstructions in this way, or
open up any new prospect, ought so far to be esteemed a benefactor to
mankind. And though these researches may appear painful and fatigu-
ing, it is with some minds as with some bodies, which being endowed
with vigorous and florid health, require severe exercise, and reap a plea-
sure from what, to the generality of mankind, may seem burdensome
and laborious. Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as well as to the
eye; but to bring light from obscurity, by whatever labour, must needs
be delightful and rejoicing.
But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy, is ob-
jected to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable source
of uncertainty and error. Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible
objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not
properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human
vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the
understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, being
unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these intangling
brambles to cover and protect their weakness. Chased from the open
country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon
every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious
fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remit his watch a
moment, is oppressed. And many, through cowardice and folly, open the10/David Hume
gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and sub-
mission, as their legal sovereigns.
7. But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist
from such researches, and leave superstition still in possession of her
retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive the
necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy?
In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will at last
abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper province of human
reason. For, besides, that many persons find too sensible an interest in
perpetually recalling such topics; besides this, I say, the motive of blind
despair can never reasonably have place in the sciences; since, however
unsuccessful former attempts may have proved, there is still room to
hope, that the industry, good fortune, or improved sagacity of succeed-
ing generations may reach discoveries unknown to former ages. Each
adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous prize, and find himself
stimulated, rather that discouraged, by the failures of his predecessors;
while he hopes that the glory of achieving so hard an adventure is re-
served for him alone. The only method of freeing learning, at once, from
these abstruse questions, is to enquire seriously into the nature of hu-
man understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and
capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse sub-
jects. We must submit to this fatigue, in order to live at ease ever after:
And must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy
the false and adulterate. Indolence, which, to some persons, affords a
safeguard against this deceitful philosophy, is, with others, overbalanced
by curiosity; and despair, which, at some moments, prevails, may give
place afterwards to sanguine hopes and expectations. Accurate and just
reasoning is the only catholic remedy, fitted for all persons and all dis-
positions; and is alone able to subvert that abstruse philosophy and
metaphysical jargon, which, being mixed up with popular superstition,
renders it in a manner impenetrable to careless reasoners, and gives it
the air of science and wisdom.
8. Besides this advantage of rejecting, after deliberate enquiry, the
most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning, there are many posi-
tive advantages, which result from an accurate scrutiny into the powers
and faculties of human nature. It is remarkable concerning the opera-
tions of the mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet, when-
ever they become the object of reflexion, they seem involved in obscu-
rity; nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries, which dis-Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/11
criminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine to remain long
in the same aspect or situation; and must be apprehended in an instant,
by a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit
and reflexion. It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science
barely to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them
from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct
all that seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made the
object of reflexion and enquiry. This talk of ordering and distinguishing,
which has no merit, when performed with regard to external bodies, the
objects of our senses, rises in its value, when directed towards the op-
erations of the mind, in proportion to the difficulty and labour, which
we meet with in performing it. And if we can go no farther than this
mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the
mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far; and the more obvious this
science may appear (and it is by no means obvious) the more contempt-
ible still must the ignorance of it be esteemed, in all pretenders to learn-
ing and philosophy.
Nor can there remain any suspicion, that this science is uncertain
and chimerical; unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is en-
tirely subversive of all speculation, and even action. It cannot be doubted,
that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these
powers are distinct from each other, that what is really distinct to the
immediate perception may be distinguished by reflexion; and conse-
quently, that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on this
subject, and a truth and falsehood, which lie not beyond the compass of
human understanding. There are many obvious distinctions of this kind,
such as those between the will and understanding, the imagination and
passions, which fall within the comprehension of every human creature;
and the finer and more philosophical distinctions are no less real and
certain, though more difficult to be comprehended. Some instances, es-
pecially late ones, of success in these enquiries, may give us a juster
notion of the certainty and solidity of this branch of learning. And shall
we esteem it worthy the labour of a philosopher to give us a true system
of the planets, and adjust the position and order of those remote bodies;
while we affect to overlook those, who, with so much success, delineate
the parts of the mind, in which we are so intimately concerned?
9. But may we not hope, that philosophy, if cultivated with care,
and encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its researches
still farther, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs and12/David Hume
principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations? As-
tronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the
phaenomena, the true motions, order, and magnitude of the heavenly
bodies: Till a philosopher, at last, arose, who seems, from the happiest
reasoning, to have also determined the laws and forces, by which the
revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been
performed with regard to other parts of nature. And there is no reason to
despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers
and economy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution. It is prob-
able, that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another;
which, again, may be resolved into one more general and universal: And
how far these researches may possibly be carried, it will be difficult for
us, before, or even after, a careful trial, exactly to determine. This is
certain, that attempts of this kind are every day made even by those who
philosophize the most negligently: And nothing can be more requisite
than to enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attention; that,
if it lie within the compass of human understanding, it may at last be
happily achieved; if not, it may, however, be rejected with some confi-
dence and security. This last conclusion, surely, is not desirable; nor
ought it to be embraced too rashly. For how much must we diminish
from the beauty and value of this species of philosophy, upon such a
supposition? Moralists have hitherto been accustomed, when they con-
sidered the vast multitude and diversity of those actions that excite our
approbation or dislike, to search for some common principle, on which
this variety of sentiments might depend. And though they have some-
times carried the matter too far, by their passion for some one general
principle; it must, however, be confessed, that they are excusable in
expecting to find some general principles, into which all the vices and
virtues were justly to be resolved. The like has been the endeavour of
critics, logicians, and even politicians: Nor have their attempts been
wholly unsuccessful; though perhaps longer time, greater accuracy, and
more ardent application may bring these sciences still nearer their per-
fection. To throw up at once all pretensions of this kind may justly be
deemed more rash, precipitate, and dogmatical, than even the boldest
and most affirmative philosophy, that has ever attempted to impose its
crude dictates and principles on mankind.
10. What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem
abstract, and of difficult comprehension? This affords no presumption
of their falsehood. On the contrary, it seems impossible, that what hasEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/13
hitherto escaped so many wise and profound philosophers can be very
obvious and easy. And whatever pains these researches may cost us, we
may think ourselves sufficiently rewarded, not only in point of profit
but of pleasure, if, by that means, we can make any addition to our
stock of knowledge, in subjects of such unspeakable importance.
But as, after all, the abstractedness of these speculations is no rec-
ommendation, but rather a disadvantage to them, and as this difficulty
may perhaps be surmounted by care and art, and the avoiding of all
unnecessary detail, we have, in the following enquiry, attempted to throw
some light upon subjects, from which uncertainty has hitherto deterred
the wise, and obscurity the ignorant. Happy, if we can unite the bound-
aries of the different species of philosophy, by reconciling profound
enquiry with clearness, and truth with novelty! And still more happy, if,
reasoning in this easy manner, we can undermine the foundations of an
abstruse philosophy, which seems to have hitherto served only as a shel-
ter to superstition, and a cover to absurdity and error!
Sect. II. Of the Origin of Ideas
11. Every one will readily allow, that there is a considerable difference
between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of ex-
cessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he after-
wards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagi-
nation. These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses;
but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original
sentiment. The utmost we say of them, even when they operate with
greatest vigour, is, that they represent their object in so lively a manner,
that we could almost say we feel or see it: But, except the mind be
disordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch
of vivacity, as to render these perceptions altogether undistinguishable.
All the colours of poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural
objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for a real
landskip. The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation.
We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other per-
ceptions of the mind. A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very
different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell
me, that any person is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and
form a just conception of his situation; but never can mistake that con-
ception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion. When we
reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful14/David Hume
mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs are
faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions
were clothed. It requires no nice discernment or metaphysical head to
mark the distinction between them.
12. Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind
into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different
degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly
denominated Thoughts or Ideas. The other species want a name in our
language, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite for
any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or
appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them Im-
pressions; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the
usual. By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively percep-
tions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will.
And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively
perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those
sensations or movements above mentioned.
13. Nothing, at first view, may seem more unbounded than the
thought of man, which not only escapes all human power and authority,
but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form
monsters, and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the imagi-
nation no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar
objects. And while the body is confined to one planet, along which it
creeps with pain and difficulty; the thought can in an instant transport
us into the most distant regions of the universe; or even beyond the
universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is supposed to lie in
total confusion. What never was seen, or heard of, may yet be con-
ceived; nor is any thing beyond the power of thought, except what im-
plies an absolute contradiction.
But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we
shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within
very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts
to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting,
or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience.
When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas,
gold, and mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtu-
ous horse we can conceive; because, from our own feeling, we can con-
ceive virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse,
which is an animal familiar to us. In short, all the materials of thinkingEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/15
are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment: the mixture
and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to
express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more feeble
perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.
14. To prove this, the two following arguments will, I hope, be suf-
ficient. First, when we analyze our thoughts or ideas, however com-
pounded or sublime, we always find that they resolve themselves into
such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment.
Even those ideas, which, at first view, seem the most wide of this origin,
are found, upon a nearer scrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of
God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being, arises
from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting,
without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. We may pros-
ecute this enquiry to what length we please; where we shall always find,
that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar impression.
Those who would assert that this position is not universally true nor
without exception, have only one, and that an easy method of refuting it;
by producing that idea, which, in their opinion, is not derived from this
source. It will then be incumbent on us, if we would maintain our doc-
trine, to produce the impression, or lively perception, which corresponds
to it.
15. Secondly. If it happen, from a defect of the organ, that a man is
not susceptible of any species of sensation, we always find that he is as
little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form no
notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. Restore either of them that
sense in which he is deficient; by opening this new inlet for his sensa-
tions, you also open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no difficulty in
conceiving these objects. The case is the same, if the object, proper for
exciting any sensation, has never been applied to the organ. A Laplander
or Negro has no notion of the relish of wine. And though there are few
or no instances of a like deficiency in the mind, where a person has
never felt or is wholly incapable of a sentiment or passion that belongs
to his species; yet we find the same observation to take place in a less
degree. A man of mild manners can form no idea of inveterate revenge
or cruelty; nor can a selfish heart easily conceive the heights of friend-
ship and generosity. It is readily allowed, that other beings may possess
many senses of which we can have no conception; because the ideas of
them have never been introduced to us in the only manner by which an
idea can have access to the mind, to wit, by the actual feeling and sensa-16/David Hume
tion.
16. There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may
prove that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise, independent
of their correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed,
that the several distinct ideas of colour, which enter by the eye, or those
of sound, which are conveyed by the ear, are really different from each
other; though, at the same time, resembling. Now if this be true of dif-
ferent colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same
colour; and each shade produces a distinct idea, independent of the rest.
For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the continual gradation of
shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it; and
if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you cannot, with-
out absurdity, deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose, therefore, a
person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become
perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds except one particular shade
of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with.
Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be
placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the light-
est; it is plain that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting,
and will be sensible that there is a greater distance in that place between
the contiguous colours than in any other. Now I ask, whether it be pos-
sible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and
raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never
been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be
of opinion that he can: and this may serve as a proof that the simple
ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent
impressions; though this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth
our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our
general maxim.
17. Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only seems, in itself,
simple and intelligible; but, if a proper use were made of it, might render
every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which has
so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn dis-
grace upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint
and obscure: the mind has but a slender hold of them: they are apt to be
confounded with other resembling ideas; and when we have often em-
ployed any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imag-
ine it has a determinate idea annexed to it. On the contrary, all impres-
sions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong andEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/17
vivid: the limits between them are more exactly determined: nor is it
easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them. When we
entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed
without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but en-
quire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be
impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By
bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove
all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality.1
But admitting these terms, impressions and ideas, in the sense above
explained, and understanding by innate, what is original or copied from
no precedent perception, then may we assert that all our impressions are
innate, and our ideas not innate.
To be ingenuous, I must own it to be my opinion, that Locke was
betrayed into this question by the Schoolmen, who, making use of unde-
fined terms, draw out their disputes to a tedious length, without ever
touching the point in question. A like ambiguity and circumlocution
seem to run through that Philosopher’s reasonings on this as well as
most other subjects.
Sect. III. Of the Association of Ideas
18. It is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the differ-
ent thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance to the
memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree
of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or discourse this
is so observable that any particular thought, which breaks in upon the
regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected.
And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our very
dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not alto-
gether at adventures, but that there was still a connexion upheld among
the different ideas, which succeeded each other. Were the loosest and
freest conversation to be transcribed, there would immediately be ob-
served something which connected it in all its transitions. Or where this
is wanting, the person who broke the thread of discourse might still
inform you, that there had secretly revolved in his mind a succession of
thought, which had gradually led him from the subject of conversation.
Among different languages, even where we cannot suspect the least
connexion or communication, it is found, that the words, expressive of
ideas, the most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other: a
certain proof that the simple ideas, comprehended in the compound ones,18/David Hume
were bound together by some universal principle, which had an equal
influence on all mankind.
19. Though it be too obvious to escape observation, that different
ideas are connected together; I do not find that any philosopher has
attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association; a sub-
ject, however, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me, there appear to be
only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, Resemblance,
Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect.
That these principles serve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be
much doubted. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original:2
the mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an en-
quiry or discourse concerning the others:3 and if we think of a wound,
we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it.4 But
that this enumeration is complete, and that there are no other principles
of association except these, may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction
of the reader, or even to a man’s own satisfaction. All we can do, in such
cases, is to run over several instances, and examine carefully the prin-
ciple which binds the different thoughts to each other, never stopping till
we render the principle as general as possible.5 The more instances we
examine, and the more care we employ, the more assurance shall we
acquire, that the enumeration, which we form from the whole, is com-
plete and entire.
Sect. IV. Sceptical Doubts concerning the
Operations of the Understanding
Part I.
20. All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided
into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the
first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in
short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively
certain. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the
two sides, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these
figures. That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a
relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discover-
able by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is
anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or
triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever
retain their certainty and evidence.Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/19
21. Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason,
are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their
truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary
of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a
contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and
distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not
rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more
contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain,
therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively
false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly con-
ceived by the mind.
It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity, to enquire what
is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and
matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the records
of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is observable, has been little
cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns; and therefore our doubts
and errors, in the prosecution of so important an enquiry, may be the
more excusable; while we march through such difficult paths without
any guide or direction. They may even prove useful, by exciting curios-
ity, and destroying that implicit faith and security, which is the bane of
all reasoning and free enquiry. The discovery of defects in the common
philosophy, if any such there be, will not, I presume, be a discourage-
ment, but rather an incitement, as is usual, to attempt something more
full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to the public.
22. All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on
the realtion of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can
go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a
man, why he believes any matter of fact, which is absent; for instance,
that his friend is in the country, or in France; he would give you a rea-
son; and this reason would be some other fact; as a letter received from
him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. A man
finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island, would conclude
that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings concern-
ing fact are of the same nature. And here it is constantly supposed that
there is a connexion between the present fact and that which is inferred
from it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would
be entirely precarious. The hearing of an articulate voice and rational
discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person: Why?
because these are the effects of the human make and fabric, and closely20/David Hume
connected with it. If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this na-
ture, we shall find that they are founded on the relation of cause and
effect, and that this relation is either near or remote, direct or collateral.
Heat and light are collateral effects of fire, and the one effect may justly
be inferred from the other.
23. If we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature
of that evidence, which assures us of matters of fact, we must enquire
how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect.
I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of
no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance,
attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when
we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each
other. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural
reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be
able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to dis-
cover any of its causes or effects. Adam, though his rational faculties be
supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from
the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate him, or
from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him. No object
ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the
causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can
our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concern-
ing real existence and matter of fact.
24. This proposition, that causes and effects are discoverable, not
by reason but by experience, will readily be admitted with regard to
such objects, as we remember to have once been altogether unknown to
us; since we must be conscious of the utter inability, which we then lay
under, of foretelling what would arise from them. Present two smooth
pieces of marble to a man who has no tincture of natural philosophy; he
will never discover that they will adhere together in such a manner as to
require great force to separate them in a direct line, while they make so
small a resistance to a lateral pressure. Such events, as bear little anal-
ogy to the common course of nature, are also readily confessed to be
known only by experience; nor does any man imagine that the explosion
of gunpowder, or the attraction of a loadstone, could ever be discovered
by arguments a priori. In like manner, when an effect is supposed to
depend upon an intricate machinery or secret structure of parts, we make
no difficulty in attributing all our knowledge of it to experience. Who
will assert that he can give the ultimate reason, why milk or bread isEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/21
proper nourishment for a man, not for a lion or a tiger?
But the same truth may not appear, at first sight, to have the same
evidence with regard to events, which have become familiar to us from
our first appearance in the world, which bear a close analogy to the
whole course of nature, and which are supposed to depend on the simple
qualities of objects, without any secret structure of parts. We are apt to
imagine that we could discover these effects by the mere operation of
our reason, without experience. We fancy, that were we brought on a
sudden into this world, we could at first have inferred that one billiard-
ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse; and that we
needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pronounce with
certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of custom, that, where it is
strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals
itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the
highest degree.
25. But to convince us that all the laws of nature, and all the opera-
tions of bodies without exception, are known only by experience, the
following reflections may, perhaps, suffice. Were any object presented
to us, and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect, which
will result from it, without consulting past observation; after what man-
ner, I beseech you, must the mind proceed in this operation? It must
invent or imagine some event, which it ascribes to the object as its ef-
fect; and it is plain that this invention must be entirely arbitrary. The
mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the
most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally differ-
ent from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion
in the second billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the
first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the
other. A stone or piece of metal raised into the air, and left without any
support, immediately falls: but to consider the matter a priori, is there
anything we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a
downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the stone or
metal?
And as the first imagination or invention of a particular effect, in all
natural operations, is arbitrary, where we consult not experience; so
must we also esteem the supposed tie or connexion between the cause
and effect, which binds them together, and renders it impossible that any
other effect could result from the operation of that cause. When I see,
for instance, a billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another;22/David Hume
even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested
to me, as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not conceive, that
a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause? May
not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return
in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? All
these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why then should we
give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable
than the rest? All our reasonings a priori will never be able to show us
any foundation for this preference.
In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It
could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first invention
or conception of it, a priori, must be entirely arbitrary. And even after it
is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally
arbitrary; since there are always many other effects, which, to reason,
must seem fully as consistent and natural. In vain, therefore, should we
pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause or effect, with-
out the assistance of observation and experience.
26. Hence we may discover the reason why no philosopher, who is
rational and modest, has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of
any natural operation, or to show distinctly the action of that power,
which produces any single effect in the universe. It is confessed, that the
utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of
natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many
particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings
from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of these
general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall we
ever be able to satisfy ourselves, by any particular explication of them.
These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human
curiosity and enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communi-
cation of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate causes and
principles which we shall ever discover in nature; and we may esteem
ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by accurate enquiry and reasoning, we
can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to, these general prin-
ciples. The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off
our ignorance a little longer: as perhaps the most perfect philosophy of
the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions
of it. Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the
result of all philosophy, and meets us at every turn, in spite of our
endeavours to elude or avoid it.Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/23
27. Nor is geometry, when taken into the assistance of natural phi-
losophy, ever able to remedy this defect, or lead us into the knowledge
of ultimate causes, by all that accuracy of reasoning for which it is so
justly celebrated. Every part of mixed mathematics proceeds upon the
supposition that certain laws are established by nature in her opera-
tions; and abstract reasonings are employed, either to assist experience
in the discovery of these laws, or to determine their influence in particu-
lar instances, where it depends upon any precise degree of distance and
quantity. Thus, it is a law of motion, discovered by experience, that the
moment or force of any body in motion is in the compound ratio or
proportion of its solid contents and its velocity; and consequently, that a
small force may remove the greatest obstacle or raise the greatest weight,
if, by any contrivance or machinery, we can increase the velocity of that
force, so as to make it an overmatch for its antagonist. Geometry assists
us in the application of this law, by giving us the just dimensions of all
the parts and figures which can enter into any species of machine; but
still the discovery of the law itself is owing merely to experience, and all
the abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one step to-
wards the knowledge of it. When we reason a priori, and consider merely
any object or cause, as it appears to the mind, independent of all obser-
vation, it never could suggest to us the notion of any distinct object,
such as its effect; much less, show us the inseparable and inviolable
connexion between them. A man must be very sagacious who could
discover by reasoning that crystal is the effect of heat, and ice of cold,
without being previously acquainted with the operation of these quali-
ties.
Part II.
28. But we have not yet attained any tolerable satisfaction with regard
to the question first proposed. Each solution still gives rise to a new
question as difficult as the foregoing, and leads us on to farther enqui-
ries. When it is asked, What is the nature of all our reasonings concern-
ing matter of fact? the proper answer seems to be, that they are founded
on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, What is the
foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that rela-
tion? it may be replied in one word, Experience. But if we still carry on
our sifting humour, and ask, What is the foundation of all conclusions
from experience? this implies a new question, which may be of more
difficult solution and explication. Philosophers, that give themselves24/David Hume
airs of superior wisdom and sufficiency, have a hard task when they
encounter persons of inquisitive dispositions, who push them from ev-
ery corner to which they retreat, and who are sure at last to bring them
to some dangerous dilemma. The best expedient to prevent this confu-
sion, is to be modest in our pretensions; and even to discover the diffi-
culty ourselves before it is objected to us. By this means, we may make
a kind of merit of our very ignorance.
I shall content myself, in this section, with an easy task, and shall
pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed. I
say then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of cause
and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on
reasoning, or any process of the understanding. This answer we must
endeavour both to explain and to defend.
29. It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great
distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of
a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those
powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely
depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of
bread; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities
which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body. Sight or
feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies; but as to that
wonderful force or power, which would carry on a moving body for
ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never lose but by
communicating it to others; of this we cannot form the most distant
conception. But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers6 and
principles, we always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that
they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those
which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a body of like
colour and consistence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be
presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating the experiment, and
foresee, with certainty, like nourishment and support. Now this is a pro-
cess of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the foun-
dation. It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connexion be-
tween the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and consequently,
that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their con-
stant and regular conjunction, by anything which it knows of their na-
ture. As to past Experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain
information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of
time, which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience should beEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/25
extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know,
may be only in appearance similar; this is the main question on which I
would insist. The bread, which I formerly eat, nourished me; that is, a
body of such sensible qualities was, at that time, endued with such se-
cret powers: but does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at
another time, and that like sensible qualities must always be attended
with like secret powers? The consequence seems nowise necessary. At
least, it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn
by the mind; that there is a certain step taken; a process of thought, and
an inference, which wants to be explained. These two propositions are
far from being the same, I have found that such an object has always
been attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that other objects, which
are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall
allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from
the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that
the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce
that reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intui-
tive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw
such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument.
What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it
is incumbent on those to produce it, who assert that it really exists, and
is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact.
30. This negative argument must certainly, in process of time, be-
come altogether convincing, if many penetrating and able philosophers
shall turn their enquiries this way and no one be ever able to discover
any connecting proposition or intermediate step, which supports the
understanding in this conclusion. But as the question is yet new, every
reader may not trust so far to his own penetration, as to conclude, be-
cause an argument escapes his enquiry, that therefore it does not really
exist. For this reason it may be requisite to venture upon a more difficult
task; and enumerating all the branches of human knowledge, endeavour
to show that none of them can afford such an argument.
All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstra-
tive reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reason-
ing, or that concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are no
demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no
contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an object,
seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with
different or contrary effects. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive26/David Hume
that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects,
resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is there any
more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees will flour-
ish in December and January, and decay in May and June? Now what-
ever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no contra-
diction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument
or abstract reasoning a priori.
If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past expe-
rience, and make it the standard of our future judgement, these argu-
ments must be probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real
existence, according to the division above mentioned. But that there is
no argument of this kind, must appear, if our explication of that species
of reasoning be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have said that all
arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause
and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from
experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the
supposition that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeav-
our, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments,
or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle,
and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.
31. In reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the
similarity which we discover among natural objects, and by which we
are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to
follow from such objects. And though none but a fool or madman will
ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience, or to reject that great
guide of human life, it may surely be allowed a philosopher to have so
much curiosity at least as to examine the principle of human nature,
which gives this mighty authority to experience, and makes us draw
advantage from that similarity which nature has placed among different
objects. From causes which appear similar we expect similar effects.
This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions. Now it seems evi-
dent that, if this conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as per-
fect at first, and upon one instance, as after ever so long a course of
experience. But the case is far otherwise. Nothing so like as eggs; yet no
one, on account of this appearing similarity, expects the same taste and
relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of uniform experi-
ments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and security with re-
gard to a particular event. Now where is that process of reasoning which,
from one instance, draws a conclusion, so different from that which itEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/27
infers from a hundred instances that are nowise different from that single
one? This question I propose as much for the sake of information, as
with an intention of raising difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine
any such reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to instruction, if any
one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me.
32. Should it be said that, from a number of uniform experiments,
we infer a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret pow-
ers; this, I must confess, seems the same difficulty, couched in different
terms. The question still recurs, on what process of argument this infer-
ence is founded? Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which join
propositions so very wide of each other? It is confessed that the colour,
consistence, and other sensible qualities of bread appear not, of them-
selves, to have any connexion with the secret powers of nourishment
and support. For otherwise we could infer these secret powers from the
first appearance of these sensible qualities, without the aid of experi-
ence; contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers, and contrary to plain
matter of fact. Here, then, is our natural state of ignorance with regard
to the powers and influence of all objects. How is this remedied by
experience? It only shows us a number of uniform effects, resulting
from certain objects, and teaches us that those particular objects, at that
particular time, were endowed with such powers and forces. When a
new object, endowed with similar sensible qualities, is produced, we
expect similar powers and forces, and look for a like effect. From a
body of like colour and consistence with bread we expect like nourish-
ment and support. But this surely is a step or progress of the mind,
which wants to be explained. When a man says, I have found, in all past
instances, such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers;
And when he says, Similar sensible qualities will always be conjoined
with similar secret powers, he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are these
propositions in any respect the same. You say that the one proposition is
an inference from the other. But you must confess that the inference is
not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then? To
say it is experimental, is begging the question. For all inferences from
experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble
the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible
qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change,
and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes
useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible,
therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resem-28/David Hume
blance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on
the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed
hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or in-
ference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. In vain do
you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experi-
ence. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influ-
ence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This
happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not
happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what pro-
cess of argument secures you against this supposition? My practice,
you say, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question.
As an agent, I am quite satisfied in the point; but as a philosopher, who
has some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the
foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to
remove my difficulty, or give me satisfaction in a matter of such impor-
tance. Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even
though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? We shall at
least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we do not augment
our knowledge.
33. I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance
who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investiga-
tion, that therefore it does not really exist. I must also confess that,
though all the learned, for several ages, should have employed them-
selves in fruitless search upon any subject, it may still, perhaps, be rash
to conclude positively that the subject must, therefore, pass all human
comprehension. Even though we examine all the sources of our knowl-
edge, and conclude them unfit for such a subject, there may still remain
a suspicion, that the enumeration is not complete, or the examination
not accurate. But with regard to the present subject, there are some
considerations which seem to remove all this accusation of arrogance or
suspicion of mistake.
It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants- nay infants,
nay even brute beasts- improve by experience, and learn the qualities of
natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When
a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle,
he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a
similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and
appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child
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may justly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any
pretence to refuse so equitable a demand. You cannot say that the argu-
ment is abstruse, and may possibly escape your enquiry; since you con-
fess that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hesitate,
therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or
profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the question, and confess
that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling
the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to ap-
pearance, similar. This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in
the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty
discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a
very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument which,
it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cradle.
Sect. V. Sceptical Solution of these Doubts
Part I.
34. The passion for philosophy, like that for religion, seems liable to
this inconvenience, that, though it aims at the correction of our man-
ners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only serve, by imprudent man-
agement. to foster a predominant inclination, and push the mind, with
more determined resolution, towards that side which already draws too
much, by the bias and propensity of the natural temper. It is certain that,
while we aspire to the magnanimous firmness of the philosophic sage,
and endeavour to confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds,
we may, at last, render our philosophy like that of Epictetus, and other
Stoics, only a more refined system of selfishness, and reason ourselves
out of all virtue as well as social enjoyment. While we study with atten-
tion the vanity of human life, and turn all our thoughts towards the
empty and transitory nature of riches and honours, we are, perhaps, all
the while flattering our natural indolence, which, hating the bustle of the
world, and drudgery of business, seeks a pretence of reason to give
itself a full and uncontrolled indulgence. There is, however, one species
of philosophy which seems little liable to this inconvenience, and that
because it strikes in with no disorderly passion of the human mind, nor
can mingle itself with any natural affection or propensity; and that is the
Academic or Sceptical philosophy. The academics always talk of doubt
and suspense of judgement, of danger in hasty determinations, of con-
fining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding, and of
renouncing all speculations which lie not within the limits of common30/David Hume
life and practice. Nothing, therefore, can be more contrary than such a
philosophy to the supine indolence of the mind, its rash arrogance, its
lofty pretensions, and its superstitious credulity. Every passion is mor-
tified by it, except the love of truth; and that passion never is, nor can
be, carried to too high a degree. It is surprising, therefore, that this
philosophy, which, in almost every instance, must be harmless and in-
nocent, should be the subject of so much groundless reproach and oblo-
quy. But, perhaps, the very circumstance which renders it so innocent is
what chiefly exposes it to the public hatred and resentment. By flatter-
ing no irregular passion, it gains few partizans: By opposing so many
vices and follies, it raises to itself abundance of enemies, who stigma-
tize it as libertine, profane, and irreligious.
Nor need we fear that this philosophy, while it endeavours to limit
our enquiries to common life, should ever undermine the reasonings of
common life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well
as speculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in
the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever. Though we should con-
clude, for instance, as in the foregoing section, that, in all reasonings
from experience, there is a step taken by the mind which is not sup-
ported by any argument or process of the understanding; there is no
danger that these reasonings, on which almost all knowledge depends,
will ever be affected by such a discovery. If the mind be not engaged by
argument to make this step, it must be induced by some other principle
of equal weight and authority; and that principle will preserve its influ-
ence as long as human nature remains the same. What that principle is
may well be worth the pains of enquiry.
35. Suppose a person, though endowed with the strongest faculties
of reason and reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world; he
would, indeed, immediately observe a continual succession of objects,
and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover
anything farther. He would not, at first, by any reasoning, be able to
reach the idea of cause and effect; since the particular powers, by which
all natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses; nor is
it reasonable to conclude, merely because one event, in one instance,
precedes another, that therefore the one is the cause, the other the effect.
Their conjunction may be arbitrary and casual. There may be no reason
to infer the existence of one from the appearance of the other. And in a
word, such a person, without more experience, could never employ his
conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact, or be assured ofEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/31
anything beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses.
Suppose, again, that he has acquired more experience, and has lived
so long in the world as to have observed familiar objects or events to be
constantly conjoined together; what is the consequence of this experi-
ence? He immediately infers the existence of one object from the ap-
pearance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any
idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces
the other; nor is it, by any process of reasoning, he is engaged to draw
this inference. But still he finds himself determined to draw it: And though
he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the opera-
tion, he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking.
There is some other principle which determines him to form such a
conclusion.
36. This principle is Custom or Habit. For wherever the repetition
of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the
same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or pro-
cess of the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the
effect of Custom. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given
the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle
of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well
known by its effects. Perhaps we can push our enquiries no farther, or
pretend to give the cause of this cause; but must rest contented with it as
the ultimate principle, which we can assign, of all our conclusions from
experience. It is sufficient satisfaction, that we can go so far, without
repining at the narrowness of our faculties because they will carry us no
farther. And it is certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition
at least, if not a true one, when we assert that, after the constant con-
junction of two objects- heat and flame, for instance, weight and solid-
ity- we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the ap-
pearance of the other. This hypothesis seems even the only one which
explains the difficulty, why we draw, from a thousand instances, an
inference which we are not able to draw from one instance, that is, in no
respect, different from them. Reason is incapable of any such variation.
The conclusions which it draws from considering one circle are the same
which it would form upon surveying all the circles in the universe. But
no man, having seen only one body move after being impelled by an-
other, could infer that every other body will move after a like impulse.
All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of
reasoning.732/David Hume
The same distinction between reason and experience is maintained
in all our deliberations concerning the conduct of life; while the experi-
enced statesman, general, physician, or merchant is trusted and followed;
and the unpractised novice, with whatever natural talents endowed, ne-
glected and despised. Though it be allowed, that reason may form very
plausible conjectures with regard to the consequences of such a particu-
lar conduct in such particular circumstances; it is still supposed imper-
fect, without the assistance of experience, which is alone able to give
stability and certainty to the maxims, derived from study and reflection.
But notwithstanding that this distinction be thus universally received,
both in the active speculative scenes of life, I shall not scruple to pro-
nounce, that it is, at bottom, erroneous, at least, superficial.
If we examine those arguments, which, in any of the sciences above
mentioned, are supposed to be mere effects of reasoning and reflection,
they will be found to terminate, at last, in some general principle or
conclusion, for which we can assign no reason but observation and ex-
perience. The only difference between them and those maxims, which
are vulgarly esteemed the result of pure experience, is, that the former
cannot be established without some process of thought, and some re-
flection on what we have observed, in order to distinguish its circum-
stances, and trace its consequences: Whereas in the latter, the experi-
enced event is exactly and fully familiar to that which we infer as the
result of any particular situation. The history of a Tiberius or a Nero
makes us dread a like tyranny, were our monarchs freed from the re-
straints of laws and senates: But the observation of any fraud or cruelty
in private life is sufficient, with the aid of a little thought, to give us the
same apprehension; while it serves as an instance of the general corrup-
tion of human nature, and shows us the danger which we must incur by
reposing an entire confidence in mankind. In both cases, it is experience
which is ultimately the foundation of our inference and conclusion.
There is no man so young and unexperienced, as not to have formed,
from observation, many general and just maxims concerning human
affairs and the conduct of life; but it must be confessed, that, when a
man comes to put these in practice, he will be extremely liable to error,
till time and farther experience both enlarge these maxims, and teach
him their proper use and application. In every situation or incident, there
are many particular and seemingly minute circumstances, which the
man of greatest talent is, at first, apt to overlook, though on them the
justness of his conclusions, and consequently the prudence of his con-Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/33
duct, entirely depend. Not to mention, that, to a young beginner, the
general observations and maxims occur not always on the proper occa-
sions, nor can be immediately applied with due calmness and distinc-
tion. The truth is, an unexperienced reasoner could be no reasoner at all,
were he absolutely unexperienced; and when we assign that character to
any one, we mean it only in a comparative sense, and suppose him pos-
sessed of experience, in a smaller and more imperfect degree.
Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle
alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect,
for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared
in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely igno-
rant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the
memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to
ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect.
There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part
of speculation.
37. But here it may be proper to remark, that though our conclu-
sions from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses, and
assure us of matters of fact which happened in the most distant places
and most remote ages, yet some fact must always be present to the
senses or memory, from which we may first proceed in drawing these
conclusions. A man, who should find in a desert country the remains of
pompous buildings, would conclude that the country had, in ancient
times, been cultivated by civilized inhabitants; but did nothing of this
nature occur to him, he could never form such an inference. We learn
the events of former ages from history; but then we must peruse the
volumes in which this instruction is contained, and thence carry up our
inferences from one testimony to another, till we arrive at the eyewit-
nesses and spectators of these distant events. In a word, if we proceed
not upon some fact, present to the memory or senses, our reasonings
would be merely hypothetical; and however the particular links might
be connected with each other, the whole chain of inferences would have
nothing to support it, nor could we ever, by its means, arrive at the
knowledge of any real existence. If I ask why you believe any particular
matter of fact, which you relate, you must tell me some reason; and this
reason will be some other fact, connected with it. But as you cannot
proceed after this manner, in infinitum, you must at last terminate in
some fact, which is present to your memory or senses; or must allow
that your belief is entirely without foundation.34/David Hume
38. What, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter? A simple
one; though, it must be confessed, pretty remote from the common theo-
ries of philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived
merely from some object, present to the memory or senses, and a cus-
tomary conjunction between that and some other object. Or in other
words; having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects-
flame and heat, snow and cold- have always been conjoined together; if
flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by
custom to expect heat or cold, and to believe that such a quality does
exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the
necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an op-
eration of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel
the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet
with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts,
which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able
either to produce or to prevent.
At this point, it would be very allowable for us to stop our philo-
sophical researches. In most questions we can never make a single step
further; and in all questions we must terminate here at last, after our
most restless and curious enquiries. But still our curiosity will be par-
donable, perhaps commendable, if it carry us on to still farther researches,
and make us examine more accurately the nature of this belief, and of
the customary conjunction, whence it is derived. By this means we may
meet with some explications and analogies that will give satisfaction; at
least to such as love the abstract sciences, and can be entertained with
speculations, which, however accurate, may still retain a degree of doubt
and uncertainty. As to readers of a different taste; the remaining part of
this section is not calculated for them, and the following enquiries may
well be understood, though it be neglected.
Part II.
39. Nothing is more free than the imagination of man; and though it
cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and
external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, sepa-
rating, and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction and vision.
It can feign a train of events, with all the appearance of reality, ascribe
to them a particular time and place, conceive them as existent, and paint
them out to itself with every circumstance, that belongs to any historical
fact, which it believes with the greatest certainty. Wherein, therefore,Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/35
consists the difference between such a fiction and belief? It lies not merely
in any peculiar idea, which is annexed to such a conception as com-
mands our assent, and which is wanting to every known fiction. For as
the mind has authority over all its ideas, it could voluntarily annex this
particular idea to any fiction, and consequently be able to believe what-
ever it pleases; contrary to what we find by daily experience. We can, in
our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horse; but it is
not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed.
It follows, therefore, that the difference between fiction and belief
lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to
the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at
pleasure. It must be excited by nature, like all other sentiments; and
must arise from the particular situation, in which the mind is placed at
any particular juncture. Whenever any object is presented to the memory
or senses, it immediately, by the force of custom, carries the imagina-
tion to conceive that object, which is usually conjoined to it; and this
conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment, different from the
loose reveries of the fancy. In this consists the whole nature of belief.
For as there is no matter of fact which we believe so firmly that we
cannot conceive the contrary, there would be no difference between the
conception assented to and that which is rejected, were it not for some
sentiment which distinguishes the one from the other. If I see a billiard-
ball moving towards another, on a smooth table, I can easily conceive it
to stop upon contact. This conception implies no contradiction; but still
it feels very differently from that conception by which I represent to
myself the impulse and the communication of motion from one ball to
another.
40. Were we to attempt a definition of this sentiment, we should,
perhaps, find it a very difficult, if not an impossible task; in the same
manner as if we should endeavour to define the feeling of cold or pas-
sion of anger, to a creature who never had any experience of these sen-
timents. Belief is the true and proper name of this feeling; and no one is
ever at a loss to know the meaning of that term; because every man is
every moment conscious of the sentiment represented by it. It may not,
however, be improper to attempt a description of this sentiment; in hopes
we may, by that means, arrive at some analogies, which may afford a
more perfect explication of it. I say, then, that belief is nothing but a
more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than
what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This variety of terms,36/David Hume
which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act
of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more
present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought,
and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination.
Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute about the
terms. The imagination has the command over all its ideas, and can join
and mix and vary them, in all the ways possible. It may conceive ficti-
tious objects with all the circumstances of place and time. It may set
them, in a manner, before our eyes, in their true colours, just as they
might have existed. But as it is impossible that this faculty of imagina-
tion can ever, of itself, reach belief, it is evident that belief consists not
in the peculiar nature or order of ideas, but in the manner of their con-
ception, and in their feeling to the mind. I confess, that it is impossible
perfectly to explain this feeling or manner of conception. We may make
use of words which express something near it. But its true and proper
name, as we observed before, is belief; which is a term that every one
sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy, we can go
no farther than assert, that belief is something felt by the mind, which
distinguishes the ideas of the judgement from the fictions of the imagi-
nation. It gives them more weight and influence; makes them appear of
greater importance; enforces them in the mind; and renders them the
governing principle of our actions. I hear at present, for instance, a
person’s voice, with whom I am acquainted; and the sound comes as
from the next room. This impression of my senses immediately conveys
my thought to the person, together with all the surrounding objects. I
paint them out to myself as existing at present, with the same qualities
and relations, of which I formerly knew them possessed. These ideas
take faster hold of my mind than ideas of an enchanted castle. They are
very different to the feeling, and have a much greater influence of every
kind, either to give pleasure or pain, joy or sorrow.
Let us, then, take in the whole compass of this doctrine, and allow,
that the sentiment of belief is nothing but a conception more intense and
steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, and that
this manner of conception arises from a customary conjunction of the
object with something present to the memory or senses: I believe that it
will not be difficult, upon these suppositions, to find other operations of
the mind analogous to it, and to trace up these phenomena to principles
still more general.
41. We have already observed that nature has established connexionsEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/37
among particular ideas, and that no sooner one idea occurs to our thoughts
than it introduces its correlative, and carries our attention towards it, by
a gentle and insensible movement. These principles of connexion or as-
sociation we have reduced to three, namely, Resemblance, Contiguity
and Causation; which are the only bonds that unite our thoughts to-
gether, and beget that regular train of reflection or discourse, which, in
a greater or less degree, takes place among all mankind. Now here arises
a question, on which the solution of the present difficulty will depend.
Does it happen, in all these relations, that, when one of the objects is
presented to the senses or memory, the mind is not only carried to the
conception of the correlative, but reaches a steadier and stronger con-
ception of it than what otherwise it would have been able to attain? This
seems to be the case with that belief which arises from the relation of
cause and effect. And if the case be the same with the other relations or
principles of associations, this may be established as a general law,
which takes place in all the operations of the mind.
We may, therefore, observe, as the first experiment to our present
purpose, that, upon the appearance of the picture of an absent friend,
our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the resemblance, and that ev-
ery passion, which that idea occasions, whether of joy or sorrow, ac-
quires new force and vigour. In producing this effect, there concur both
a relation and a present impression. Where the picture bears him no
resemblance, at least was not intended for him, it never so much as
conveys our thought to him: And where it is absent, as well as the per-
son, though the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of the
other, it feels its idea to be rather weakened than enlivened by that tran-
sition. We take a pleasure in viewing the picture of a friend, when it is
set before us; but when it is removed, rather choose to consider him
directly than by reflection in an image, which is equally distant and
obscure.
The ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion may be considered
as instances of the same nature. The devotees of that superstition usu-
ally plead in excuse for the mummeries, with which they are upbraided,
that they feel the good effect of those external motions, and postures,
and actions, in enlivening their devotion and quickening their fervour,
which otherwise would decay, if directed entirely to distant and immate-
rial objects. We shadow out the objects of our faith, say they, in sensible
types and images, and render them more present to us by the immediate
presence of these types, than it is possible for us to do merely by an38/David Hume
intellectual view and contemplation. Sensible objects have always a
greater influence on the fancy than any other; and this influence they
readily convey to those ideas to which they are related, and which they
resemble. I shall only infer from these practices, and this reasoning, that
the effect of resemblance in enlivening the ideas is very common; and as
in every case a resemblance and a present impression must concur, we
are abundantly supplied with experiments to prove the reality of the
foregoing principle.
42. We may add force to these experiments by others of a different
kind, in considering the effects of contiguity as well as of resemblance.
It is certain that distance diminishes the force of every idea, and that,
upon our approach to any object, though it does not discover itself to
our senses it operates upon the mind with an influence, which imitates
an immediate impression. The thinking on any object readily transports
the mind to what is contiguous; but it is only the actual presence of an
object, that transports it with a superior vivacity. When I am a few miles
from home, whatever relates to it touches me more nearly than when I
am two hundred leagues distant; though even at that distance the reflect-
ing on anything in the neighbourhood of my friends or family naturally
produces an idea of them. But as in this latter case, both the objects of
the mind are ideas; notwithstanding there is an easy transition between
them; that transition alone is not able to give a superior vivacity to any
of the ideas, for want of some immediate impression.8
43. No one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the
other two relations of resemblance and contiguity. Superstitious people
are fond of the reliques of saints and holy men, for the same reason, that
they seek after types or images, in order to enliven their devotion, and
give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary
lives, which they desire to imitate. Now it is evident, that one of the best
reliques, which a devotee could procure, would be the handywork of a
saint; and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be considered in this
light, it is because they were once at his disposal, and were moved and
affected by him; in which respect they are to be considered as imperfect
effects, and as connected with him by a shorter chain of consequences
than any of those, by which we learn the reality of his existence.
Suppose, that the son of a friend, who had been long dead or absent,
were presented to us; it is evident, that this object would instantly revive
its correlative idea, and recal to our thoughts all past intimacies and
familiarities, in more lively colours than they would otherwise have ap-Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/39
peared to us. This is another phaenomenon, which seems to prove the
principle above mentioned.
44. We may observe, that, in these phaenomena, the belief of the
correlative object is always presupposed; without which the relation
could have no effect. The influence of the picture supposes, that we
believe our friend to have once existed. Continguity to home can never
excite our ideas of home, unless we believe that it really exists. Now I
assert, that this belief, where it reaches beyond the memory or senses, is
of a similar nature, and arises from similar causes, with the transition of
thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I throw a piece
of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that
it augments, not extinguishes the flame. This transition of thought from
the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It derives its origin
altogether from custom and experience. And as it first begins from an
object, present to the senses, it renders the idea or conception of flame
more strong and lively than any loose, floating reverie of the imagina-
tion. That idea arises immediately. The thought moves instantly towards
it, and conveys to it all that force of conception, which is derived from
the impression present to the senses. When a sword is levelled at my
breast, does not the idea of wound and pain strike me more strongly,
than when a glass of wine is presented to me, even though by accident
this idea should occur after the appearance of the latter object? But
what is there in this whole matter to cause such a strong conception,
except only a present object and a customary transition to the idea of
another object, which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the
former? This is the whole operation of the mind, in all our conclusions
concerning matter of fact and existence; and it is a satisfaction to find
some analogies, by which it may be explained. The transition from a
present object does in all cases give strength and solidity to the related
idea.
Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course
of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and
forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet
our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same
train with the other works of nature. Custom is that principle, by which
this correspondence has been effected; so necessary to the subsistence
of our species, and the regulation of our conduct, in every circumstance
and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an object, in-
stantly excited the idea of those objects, commonly conjoined with it, all40/David Hume
our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our
memory and senses; and we should never have been able to adjust means
to ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good,
or avoiding of evil. Those, who delight in the discovery and contempla-
tion of final causes, have here ample subject to employ their wonder and
admiration.
45. I shall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory,
that, as this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from
like causes, and vice versa, is so essential to the subsistence of all hu-
man creatures, it is not probable, that it could be trusted to the falla-
cious deductions of our reason, which is slow in its operations; appears
not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at best is, in
every age and period of human life, extremely liable to error and mis-
take. It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure
so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical ten-
dency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at
the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all
the laboured deductions of the understanding. As nature has taught us
the use of our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the muscles
and nerves, by which they are actuated; so has she implanted in us an
instinct, which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to
that which she has established among external objects; though we are
ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course and
succession of objects totally depends.
Sect. VI. Of Probability9
46. Though there be no such thing as Chance in the world; our igno-
rance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the under-
standing, and begets a like species of belief or opinion.
There is certainly a probability, which arises from a superiority of
chances on any side; and according as this superiority encreases, and
surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a proportion-
able encrease, and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that
side, in which we discover the superiority. If a die were marked with one
figure or number of spots on four sides, and with another figure or
number of spots on the two remaining sides, it would be more probable,
that the former would turn up than the latter; though, if it had a thou-
sand sides marked in the same manner, and only one side different, the
probability would be much higher, and our belief or expectation of theEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/41
event more steady and secure. This process of the thought or reasoning
may seem trivial and obvious; but to those who consider it more nar-
rowly, it may, perhaps, afford matter for curious speculation.
It seems evident, that, when the mind looks forward to discover the
event, which may result from the throw of such a die, it considers the
turning up of each particular side as alike probable; and this the very
nature of chance, to render all the particular events, comprehended in it,
entirely equal. But finding a greater number of sides concur in the one
event than in the other, the mind is carried more frequently to that event,
and meets it oftener, in revolving the various possibilities or chances, on
which the ultimate result depends. This concurrence of several views in
one particular event begets immediately, by an inexplicable contrivance
of nature, the sentiment of belief, and gives that event the advantage
over its antagonist, which is supported by a smaller number of views,
and recurs less frequently to the mind. If we allow, that belief is nothing
but a firmer and stronger conception of an object than what attends the
mere fictions of the imagination, this operation may, perhaps, in some
measure, be accounted for. The concurrence of these several views or
glimpses imprints the idea more strongly on the imagination; gives it
superior force and vigour; renders its influence on the passions and af-
fections more sensible; and in a word, begets that reliance or security,
which constitutes the nature of belief and opinion.
47. The case is the same with the probability of causes, as with that
of chance. There are some causes, which are entirely uniform and con-
stant in producing a particular effect; and no instance has ever yet been
found of any failure or irregularity in their operation. Fire has always
burned, and water suffocated every human creature: The production of
motion by impulse and gravity is an universal law, which has hitherto
admitted of no exception. But there are other causes, which have been
found more irregular and uncertain; nor has rhubarb always proved a
purge, or opium a soporific to every one, who has taken these medi-
cines. It is true, when any cause fails of producing its usual effect, phi-
losophers ascribe not this to any irregularity in nature; but suppose, that
some secret causes, in the particular structure of parts, have prevented
the operation. Our reasonings, however, and conclusions concerning the
event are the same as if this principle had no place. Being determined by
custom to transfer the past to the future, in all our inferences; where the
past has been entirely regular and uniform, we expect the event with the
greatest assurance, and leave no room for any contrary supposition. But42/David Hume
where different effects have been found to follow from causes, which
are to appearance exactly similar, all these various effects must occur to
the mind in transferring the past to the future, and enter into our consid-
eration, when we determine the probability of the event. Though we
give the preference to that which has been found most usual, and believe
that this effect will exist, we must not overlook the other effects, but
must assign to each of them a particular weight and authority, in pro-
portion as we have found it to be more or less frequent. It is more prob-
able, in almost every country of Europe, that there will be frost some-
time in January, than that the weather will continue open throughout
that whole month; though this probability varies according to the differ-
ent climates, and approaches to a certainty in the more northern king-
doms. Here then it seems evident, that, when we transfer the past to the
future, in order to determine the effect, which will result from any cause,
we transfer all the different events, in the same proportion as they have
appeared in the past, and conceive one to have existed a hundred times,
for instance, another ten times, and another once. As a great number of
views do here concur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the
imagination, beget that sentiment which we call belief, and give its ob-
ject the preference above the contrary event, which is not supported by
an equal number of experiments, and recurs not so frequently to the
thought in transferring the past to the future. Let any one try to account
for this operation of the mind upon any of the received systems of phi-
losophy, and he will be sensible of the difficulty. For my part, I shall
think it sufficient, if the present hints excite the curiosity of philoso-
phers, and make them sensible how defective all common theories are in
treating of such curious and such sublime subjects.
Sect. VII. Of the Idea of necessary Connexion
Part I.
48 The great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral
consists in this, that the ideas of the former, being sensible, are always
clear and determinate, the smallest distinction between them is immedi-
ately perceptible, and the same terms are still expressive of the same
ideas, without ambiguity or variation. An oval is never mistaken for a
circle, nor an hyperbola for an ellipsis. The isosceles and scalenum are
distinguished by boundaries more exact than vice and virtue, right and
wrong. If any term be defined in geometry, the mind readily, of itself,
substitutes, on all occasions, the definition for the term defined: Or evenEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/43
when no definition is employed, the object itself may be presented to the
senses, and by that means be steadily and clearly apprehended. But the
finer sentiments of the mind, the operations of the understanding, the
various agitations of the passions, though really in themselves distinct,
easily escape us, when surveyed by reflection; nor is it in our power to
recal the original object, as often as we have occasion to contemplate it.
Ambiguity, by this means, is gradually introduced into our reasonings:
Similar objects are readily taken to be the same: And the conclusion
becomes at last very wide of the premises.
One may safely, however, affirm, that, if we consider these sciences
in a proper light, their advantages and disadvantages nearly compensate
each other, and reduce both of them to a state of equality. If the mind,
with greater facility, retains the ideas of geometry clear and determi-
nate, it must carry on a much longer and more intricate chain of reason-
ing, and compare ideas much wider of each other, in order to reach the
abstruser truths of that science. And if moral ideas are apt, without
extreme care, to fall into obscurity and confusion, the inferences are
always much shorter in these disquisitions, and the intermediate steps,
which lead to the conclusion, much fewer than in the sciences which
treat of quantity and number. In reality, there is scarcely a proposition
in Euclid so simple, as not to consist of more parts, than are to be found
in any moral reasoning which runs not into chimera and conceit. Where
we trace the principles of the human mind through a few steps, we may
be very well satisfied with our progress; considering how soon nature
throws a bar to all our enquiries concerning causes, and reduces us to an
acknowledgment of our ignorance. The chief obstacle, therefore, to our
improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of
the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms. The principal difficulty in the
mathematics is the length of inferences and compass of thought, requi-
site to the forming of any conclusion. And, perhaps, our progress in
natural philosophy is chiefly retarded by the want of proper experi-
ments and phaenomena, which are often discovered by chance, and can-
not always be found, when requisite, even by the most diligent and pru-
dent enquiry. As moral philosophy seems hitherto to have received less
improvement than either geometry or physics, we may conclude, that, if
there be any difference in this respect among these sciences, the difficul-
ties, which obstruct the progress of the former, require superior care
and capacity to be surmounted.
49. There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure44/David Hume
and uncertain, than those of power, force, energy or necessary connexion,
of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all our disquisi-
tions. We shall, therefore, endeavour, in this section, to fix, if possible,
the precise meaning of these terms, and thereby remove some part of
that obscurity, which is so much complained of in this species of phi-
losophy.
It seems a proposition, which will not admit of much dispute, that
all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in other
words, that it is impossible for us to think of anything, which we have
not antecedently felt, either by our external or internal senses. I have
endeavoured10 to explain and prove this proposition, and have expressed
my hopes, that, by a proper application of it, men may reach a greater
clearness and precision in philosophical reasonings, than what they have
hitherto been able to attain. Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known
by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or
simple ideas, that compose them. But when we have pushed up defini-
tions to the most simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and obscu-
rity; what resource are we then possessed of? By what invention can we
throw light upon these ideas, and render them altogether precise and
determinate to our intellectual view? Produce the impressions or origi-
nal sentiments, from which the ideas are copied. These impressions are
all strong and sensible. They admit not of ambiguity. They are not only
placed in a full light themselves, but may throw light on their correspon-
dent ideas, which lie in obscurity. And by this means, we may, perhaps,
attain a new microscope or species of optics, by which, in the moral
sciences, the most minute, and most simple ideas may be so enlarged as
to fall readily under our apprehension, and be equally known with the
grossest and most sensible ideas, that can be the object of our enquiry.
50. To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of power or
necessary connexion, let us examine its impression; and in order to find
the impression with greater certainty, let us search for it in all the sources,
from which it may possibly be derived.
When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the
operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover
any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect
to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other.
We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The
impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This
is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sen-Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/45
timent or inward impression from this succession of objects: Conse-
quently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and ef-
fect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary
connexion.
From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture
what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any
cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even with-
out experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning
it, by mere dint of thought and reasoning.
In reality, there is no part of matter, that does ever, by its sensible
qualities, discover any power or energy, or give us ground to imagine,
that it could produce any thing, or be followed by any other object,
which we could denominate its effect. Solidity, extension, motion; these
qualities are all complete in themselves, and never point out any other
event which may result from them. The scenes of the universe are con-
tinually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted suc-
cession; but the power of force, which actuates the whole machine, is
entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sen-
sible qualities of body. We know, that, in fact, heat is a constant atten-
dant of flame; but what is the connexion between them, we have no
room so much as to conjecture or imagine. It is impossible, therefore,
that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies,
in single instances of their operation; because no bodies ever discover
any power, which can be the original of this idea.11
51. Since, therefore, external objects as they appear to the senses,
give us no idea of power or necessary connexion, by their operation in
particular instances, let us see, whether this idea be derived from reflec-
tion on the operations of our own minds, and be copied from any inter-
nal impression. It may be said, that we are every moment conscious of
internal power; while we feel, that, by the simple command of our will,
we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our mind.
An act of volition produces motion in our limbs, or raises a new idea in
our imagination. This influence of the will we know by consciousness.
Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy; and are certain, that we
ourselves and all other intelligent beings are possessed of power. This
idea, then, is an idea of reflection, since it arises from reflecting on the
operations of our own mind, and on the command which is exercised by
will, both over the organs of the body and faculties of the soul.
52. We shall proceed to examine this pretension; and first with re-46/David Hume
gard to the influence of volition over the organs of the body. This influ-
ence, we may observe, is a fact, which, like all other natural events, can
be known only be experience, and can never be foreseen from any ap-
parent energy or power in the cause, which connects it with the effect,
and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. The motion
of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are every
moment conscious. But the means, by which this is effected; the energy,
by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation; of this we are
so far from being immediately conscious, that it must for ever escape
our most diligent enquiry.
For first; is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than
the union of soul with body; by which a supposed spiritual substance
acquires such an influence over a material one, that the most refined
thought is able to actuate the grossest matter? Were we empowered, by
a secret wish, to remove mountains, or control the planets in their orbit;
this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more be-
yond our comprehension. But if by consciousness we perceived any
power or energy in the will, we must know this power; we must know its
connexion with the effect; we must know the secret union of soul and
body, and the nature of both these substances; by which the one is able
to operate, in so many instances, upon the other.
Secondly, We are not able to move all the organs of the body with a
like authority; though we cannot assign any reason besides experience,
for so remarkable a difference between one and the other. Why has the
will an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart or liver?
This question would never embarrass us, were we conscious of a power
in the former case, not in the latter. We should then perceive, indepen-
dent of experience, why the authority of will over the organs of the body
is circumscribed within such particular limits. Being in that case fully
acquainted with the power or force, by which it operates, we should also
know, why its influence reaches precisely to such boundaries, and no
farther.
A man, suddenly struck with palsy in the leg or arm, or who had
newly lost those members, frequently endeavours, at first to move them,
and employ them in their usual offices. Here he is as much conscious of
power to command such limbs, as a man in perfect health is conscious
of power to actuate any member which remains in its natural state and
condition. But consciousness never deceives. Consequently, neither in
the one case nor in the other, are we ever conscious of any power. WeEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/47
learn the influence of our will from experience alone. And experience
only teaches us, how one event constantly follows another; without in-
structing us in the secret connexion, which binds them together, and
renders them inseparable.
Thirdly, We learn from anatomy, that the immediate object of power
in voluntary motion, is not the member itself which is moved, but cer-
tain muscles, and nerves, and animal spirits, and, perhaps, something
still more minute and more unknown, through which the motion is suc-
cessively propagated, ere it reach the member itself whose motion is the
immediate object of volition. Can there be a more certain proof, that the
power, by which this whole operation is performed, so far from being
directly and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness, is, to
the last degree, mysterious and unintelligible? Here the mind wills a
certain event: Immediately another event, unknown to ourselves, and
totally different from the one intended, is produced: This event produces
another, equally unknown: Till at last, through a long succession, the
desired event is produced. But if the original power were felt, it must be
known: Were it known, its effect also must be known; since all power is
relative to its effect. And vice versa, if the effect be not known, the
power cannot be known nor felt. How indeed can we be conscious of a
power to move our limbs, when we have no such power; but only that to
move certain animal spirits, which, though they produce at last the mo-
tion of our limbs, yet operate in such a manner as is wholly beyond our
comprehension?
We may, therefore, conclude from the whole, I hope, without any
temerity, though with assurance; that our idea of power is not copied
from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves, when
we give rise to animal motion, or apply our limbs to their proper use and
office. That their motion follows the command of the will is a matter of
common experience, like other natural events: But the power or energy
by which this is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown
and inconceivable.12
53. Shall we then assert, that we are conscious of a power or energy
in our own minds, when, by an act or command of our will, we raise up
a new idea, fix the mind to the contemplation of it, turn it on all sides,
and at last dismiss it for some other idea, when we think that we have
surveyed it with sufficient accuracy? I believe the same arguments will
prove, that even this command of the will gives us no real idea of force
or energy.48/David Hume
First, It must be allowed, that, when we know a power, we know
that very circumstance in the cause, by which it is enabled to produce
the effect: For these are supposed to be synonimous. We must, there-
fore, know both the cause and effect, and the relation between them. But
do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and
the nature of an idea, or the aptitude of the one to produce the other?
This is a real creation; a production of something out of nothing: Which
implies a power so great, that it may seem, at first sight, beyond the
reach of any being, less than infinite. At least it must be owned, that
such a power is not felt, nor known, nor even conceivable by the mind.
We only feel the event, namely, the existence of an idea, consequent to a
command of the will: But the manner, in which this operation is per-
formed, the power by which it is produced, is entirely beyond our com-
prehension.
Secondly, The command of the mind over itself is limited, as well as
its command over the body; and these limits are not known by reason, or
any acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect, but only by expe-
rience and observation, as in all other natural events and in the opera-
tion of external objects. Our authority over our sentiments and passions
is much weaker than that over our ideas; and even the latter authority is
circumscribed within very narrow boundaries. Will any one pretend to
assign the ultimate reason of these boundaries, or show why the power
is deficient in one case, not in another.
Thirdly, This self-command is very different at different times. A
man in health possesses more of it than one languishing with sickness.
We are more master of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening:
Fasting, than after a full meal. Can we give any reason for these varia-
tions, except experience? Where then is the power, of which we pretend
to be conscious? Is there not here, either in a spiritual or material sub-
stance, or both, some secret mechanism or structure of parts, upon which
the effect depends, and which, being entirely unknown to us, renders the
power or energy of the will equally unknown and incomprehensible?
Volition is surely an act of the mind, with which we are sufficiently
acquainted. Reflect upon it. Consider it on all sides. Do you find any-
thing in it like this creative power, by which it raises from nothing a new
idea, and with a kind of Fiat, imitates the omnipotence of its Maker, if I
may be allowed so to speak, who called forth into existence all the vari-
ous scenes of nature? So far from being conscious of this energy in the
will, it requires as certain experience as that of which we are possessed,Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/49
to convince us that such extraordinary effects do ever result from a
simple act of volition.
54. The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in account-
ing for the more common and familiar operations of nature- such as the
descent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of animals,
or the nourishment of bodies by food: But suppose that, in all these
cases, they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is
connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in its operation. They
acquire, by long habit, such a turn of mind, that, upon the appearance of
the cause, they immediately expect with assurance its usual attendant,
and hardly conceive it possible that any other event could result from it.
It is only on the discovery of extraordinary phaenomena, such as earth-
quakes, pestilence, and prodigies of any kind, that they find themselves
at a loss to assign a proper cause, and to explain the manner in which
the effect is produced by it. It is usual for men, in such difficulties, to
have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle13 as the immediate
cause of that event which surprises them, and which, they think, cannot
be accounted for from the common powers of nature. But philosophers,
who carry their scrutiny a little farther, immediately perceive that, even
in the most familiar events, the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as
in the most unusual, and that we only learn by experience the frequent
Conjunction of objects, without being ever able to comprehend anything
like Connexion between them.
55. Here, then, many philosophers think themselves obliged by rea-
son to have recourse, on all occasions, to the same principle, which the
vulgar never appeal to but in cases that appear miraculous and super-
natural. They acknowledge mind and intelligence to be, not only the
ultimate and original cause of all things, but the immediate and sole
cause of every event which appears in nature. They pretend that those
objects which are commonly denominated causes, are in reality nothing
but occasions; and that the true and direct principle of every effect is not
any power or force in nature, but a volition of the Supreme Being, who
wills that such particular objects should for ever be conjoined with each
other. Instead of saying that one billiard-ball moves another by a force
which it has derived from the author of nature, it is the Deity himself,
they say, who, by a particular volition, moves the second ball, being
determined to this operation by the impulse of the first ball, in conse-
quence of those general laws which he has laid down to himself in the
government of the universe. But philosophers advancing still in their50/David Hume
inquiries, discover that, as we are totally ignorant of the power on which
depends the mutual operation of bodies, we are no less ignorant of that
power on which depends the operation of mind on body, or of body on
mind; nor are we able, either from our senses or consciousness, to as-
sign the ultimate principle in one case more than in the other. The same
ignorance, therefore, reduces them to the same conclusion. They assert
that the Deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul and
body; and that they are not the organs of sense, which, being agitated by
external objects, produce sensations in the mind; but that it is a particu-
lar volition of our omnipotent Maker, which excites such a sensation, in
consequence of such a motion in the organ. In like manner, it is not any
energy in the will that produces local motion in our members: It is God
himself, who is pleased to second our will, in itself impotent, and to
command that motion which we erroneously attribute to our own power
and efficacy. Nor do philosophers stop at this conclusion. They some-
times extend the same inference to the mind itself, in its internal opera-
tions. Our mental vision or conception of ideas is nothing but a revela-
tion made to us by our Maker. When we voluntarily turn our thoughts to
any object, and raise up its image in the fancy, it is not the will which
creates that idea: It is the universal Creator, who discovers it to the
mind, and renders it present to us.
56. Thus, according to these philosophers, every thing is full of
God. Not content with the principle, that nothing exists but by his will,
that nothing possesses any power but by his concession: They rob na-
ture, and all created beings, of every power, in order to render their
dependence on the Deity still more sensible and immediate. They con-
sider not that, by this theory, they diminish, instead of magnifying, the
grandeur of those attributes, which they affect so much to celebrate. It
argues surely more power in the Deity to delegate a certain degree of
power to inferior creatures than to produce every thing by his own im-
mediate volition. It argues more wisdom to contrive at first the fabric of
the world with such perfect foresight that, of itself, and by its proper
operation, it may serve all the purposes of providence, than if the great
Creator were obliged every moment to adjust its parts, and animate by
his breath all the wheels of that stupendous machine.
But if we would have a more philosophical confutation of this theory,
perhaps the two following reflections may suffice.
57. First, it seems to me that this theory of the universal energy and
operation of the Supreme Being is too bold ever to carry conviction withEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/51
it to a man, sufficiently apprized of the weakness of human reason, and
the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations. Though the
chain of arguments which conduct to it were ever so logical, there must
arise a strong suspicion, if not an absolute assurance, that it has carried
us quite beyond the reach of our faculties, when it leads to conclusions
so extraordinary, and so remote from common life and experience. We
are got into fairy land, long ere we have reached the last steps of our
theory; and there we have no reason to trust our common methods of
argument, or to think that our usual analogies and probabilities have
any authority. Our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses.
And however we may flatter ourselves that we are guided, in every step
which we take, by a kind of verisimilitude and experience, we may be
assured that this fancied experience has no authority when we thus ap-
ply it to subjects that lie entirely out of the sphere of experience. But on
this we shall have occasion to touch afterwards.14
Secondly, I cannot perceive any force in the arguments on which
this theory is founded. We are ignorant, it is true, of the manner in which
bodies operate on each other: Their force or energy is entirely incompre-
hensible: But are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by
which a mind, even the supreme mind, operates either on itself or on
body? Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? We have no
sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves. We have no idea
of the Supreme Being but what we learn from reflection on our own
faculties. Were our ignorance, therefore, a good reason for rejecting
anything, we should be led into that principle of denying all energy in
the Supreme Being as much as in the grossest matter. We surely com-
prehend as little the operations of one as of the other. Is it more difficult
to conceive that motion may arise from impulse than that it may arise
from volition? All we know is our profound ignorance in both cases.15
Part II.
58. But to hasten to a conclusion of this argument, which is already
drawn out to too great a length: We have sought in vain for an idea of
power or necessary connexion in all the sources from which we could
suppose it to be derived. It appears that, in single instances of the opera-
tion of bodies, we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover anything
but one event following another, without being able to comprehend any
force or power by which the cause operates, or any connexion between
it and its supposed effect. The same difficulty occurs in contemplating52/David Hume
the operations of mind on body- where we observe the motion of the
latter to follow upon the volition of the former, but are not able to ob-
serve or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and volition,
or the energy by which the mind produces this effect. The authority of
the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whit more comprehen-
sible: So that, upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature,
any one instance of connexion which is conceivable by us. All events
seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we
never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never
connected. And as we can have no idea of any thing which never ap-
peared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclu-
sion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and
that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed
either in philosophical reasonings or common life.
59. But there still remains one method of avoiding this conclusion,
and one source which we have not yet examined. When any natural
object or event is presented, it is impossible for us, by any sagacity or
penetration, to discover, or even conjecture, without experience, what
event will result from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object
which is immediately present to the memory and senses. Even after one
instance or experiment where we have observed a particular event to
follow upon another, we are not entitled to form a general rule, or fore-
tell what will happen in like cases; it being justly esteemed an unpardon-
able temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one single
experiment, however accurate or certain. But when one particular spe-
cies of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another,
we make no any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the
other, and of employing that reasoning, which can alone assure us of
any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one object, Cause; the
other, Effect. We suppose that there is some connexion between them;
some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and
operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.
It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events
arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant
conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any
one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But
there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single
instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after
a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon theEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/53
appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe
that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind,
this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual
attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of
power or necessary connexion. Nothing farther is in the case. Contem-
plate the subject on all sides; you will never find any other origin of that
idea. This is the sole difference between one instance, from which we
can never receive the idea of connexion, and a number of similar in-
stances, by which it is suggested. The first time a man saw the commu-
nication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard balls, he
could not pronounce that the one event was connected: but only that it
was conjoined with the other. After he has observed several instances of
this nature, he then pronounces them to be connected. What alteration
has happened to give rise to this new idea of connexion? Nothing but
that he now feels these events to be connected in his imagination, and
can readily foretell the existence of one from the appearance of the other.
When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we
mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give
rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other’s exist-
ence: A conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary, but which seems
founded on sufficient evidence. Nor will its evidence be weakened by
any general diffidence of the understanding, or sceptical suspicion con-
cerning every conclusion which is new and extraordinary. No conclu-
sions can be more agreeable to scepticism than such as make discover-
ies concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human reason and
capacity.
60. And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising
ignorance and weakness of the understanding than the present? For surely,
if there be any relation among objects which it imports to us to know
perfectly, it is that of cause and effect. On this are founded all our rea-
sonings concerning matter of fact or existence. By means of it alone we
attain any assurance concerning objects which are removed from the
present testimony of our memory and senses. The only immediate utility
of all sciences, is to teach us, how to control and regulate future events
by their causes. Our thoughts and enquiries are, therefore, every mo-
ment, employed about this relation: Yet so imperfect are the ideas which
we form concerning it, that it is impossible to give any just definition of
cause, except what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to
it. Similar objects are always conjoined with similar. Of this we have54/David Hume
experience. Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause
to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to
the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or in other words
where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed. The
appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary transi-
tion, to the idea of the effect. Of this also we have experience. We may,
therefore, suitably to this experience, form another definition of cause,
and call it, an object followed by another, and whose appearance always
conveys the thought to that other. But though both these definitions be
drawn from circumstances foreign to the cause, we cannot remedy this
inconvenience, or attain any more perfect definition, which may point
out that circumstance in the cause, which gives it a connexion with its
effect. We have no idea of this connexion, nor even any distinct notion
what it is we desire to know, when we endeavour at a conception of it.
We say, for instance, that the vibration of this string is the cause of this
particular sound. But what do we mean by that affirmation? We either
mean that this vibration is followed by this sound, and that all similar
vibrations have been followed by similar sounds: Or, that this vibration
is followed by this sound, and that upon the appearance of one the mind
anticipates the senses, and forms immediately an idea of the other. We
may consider the relation of cause and effect in either of these two lights;
but beyond these, we have no idea of it.16
As to the frequent use of the words, Force, Power, Energy, &c.,
which every where occur in common conversation, as well as in phi-
losophy; that is no proof, that we are acquainted, in any instance, with
the connecting principle between cause and effect, or can account ulti-
mately for the production of one thing to another. These words, as com-
monly used, have very loose meanings annexed to them; and their ideas
are very uncertain and confused. No animal can put external bodies in
motion without the sentiment of a nisus or endeavour; and every animal
has a sentiment or feeling from the stroke or blow of an external object
that is in motion. These sensations, which are merely animal, and from
which we can a priori draw no inference, we are apt to transfer to inani-
mate objects, and to suppose, that they have some such feelings, when-
ever they transfer or receive motion. With regard to energies, which are
exerted, without our annexing to them any idea of communicated mo-
tion, we consider only the constant experienced conjunction of the events;
and as we feel a customary connexion between the ideas, we transfer
that feeling to the objects; as nothing is more usual than to apply toEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/55
external bodies every internal sensation, which they occasion.
61. To recapitulate, therefore, the reasonings of this section: Every
idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and where
we cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea.
In all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is noth-
ing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any
idea of power or necessary connexion. But when many uniform instances
appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event; we
then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion. We then feel
a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connexion in the
thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant; and
this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for. For as this
idea arises from a number of similar instances, and not from any single
instance, it must arise from that circumstance, in which the number of
instances differ from every individual instance. But this customary
connexion or transition of the imagination is the only circumstance in
which they differ. In every other particular they are alike. The first in-
stance which we saw of motion communicated by the shock of two bil-
liard balls (to return to this obvious illustration) is exactly similar to any
instance that may, at present, occur to us; except only, that we could
not, at first, infer one event from the other; which we are enabled to do
at present, after so long a course of uniform experience. I know not
whether the reader will readily apprehend this reasoning. I am afraid
that, should I multiply words about it, or throw it into a greater variety
of lights, it would only become more obscure and intricate. In all ab-
stract reasonings there is one point of view which, if we can happily hit,
we shall go farther towards illustrating the subject than by all the elo-
quence and copious expression in the world. This point of view we should
endeavour to reach, and reserve the flowers of rhetoric for subjects which
are more adapted to them.
Sect. VIII. Of Liberty and Necessity
Part I.
62. It might reasonably be expected in questions which have been can-
vassed and disputed with great eagerness, since the first origin of sci-
ence and philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at least, should
have been agreed upon among the disputants; and our enquiries, in the
course of two thousand years, been able to pass from words to the true
and real subject of the controversy. For how easy may it seem to give56/David Hume
exact definitions of the terms employed in reasoning, and make these
definitions, not the mere sound of words, the object of future scrutiny
and examination? But if we consider the matter more narrowly, we shall
be apt to draw a quite opposite conclusion. From this circumstance alone,
that a controversy has been long kept on foot, and remains still unde-
cided, we may presume that there is some ambiguity in the expression,
and that the disputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the
controversy. For as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be natu-
rally alike in every individual; otherwise nothing could be more fruitless
than to reason or dispute together; it were impossible, if men affix the
same ideas to their terms, that they could so long form different opin-
ions of the same subject; especially when they communicate their views,
and each party turn themselves on all sides, in search of arguments
which may give them the victory over their antagonists. It is true, if men
attempt the discussion of questions which lie entirely beyond the reach
of human capacity, such as those concerning the origin of worlds, or the
economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits, they may long
beat the air in their fruitless contests, and never arrive at any determi-
nate conclusion. But if the question regard any subject of common life
and experience, nothing, one would think, could preserve the dispute so
long undecided but some ambiguous expressions, which keep the an-
tagonists still at a distance, and hinder them from grappling with each
other.
63. This has been the case in the long disputed question concerning
liberty and necessity; and to so remarkable a degree that, if I be not
much mistaken, we shall find, that all mankind, both learned and igno-
rant, have always been of the same opinion with regard to this subject,
and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an
end to the whole controversy. I own that this dispute has been so much
canvassed on all hands, and has led philosophers into such a labyrinth
of obscure sophistry, that it is no wonder, if a sensible reader indulge his
ease so far as to turn a deaf ear to the proposal of such a question, from
which he can expect neither instruction or entertainment. But the state
of the argument here proposed may, perhaps, serve to renew his atten-
tion; as it has more novelty, promises at least some decision of the con-
troversy, and will not much disturb his ease by any intricate or obscure
reasoning.
I hope, therefore, to make it appear that all men have ever agreed in
the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty, according to any reason-Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/57
able sense, which can be put on these terms; and that the whole contro-
versy has hitherto turned merely upon words. We shall begin with ex-
amining the doctrine of necessity.
64. It is universally allowed that matter, in all its operations, is
actuated by a necessary force, and that every natural effect is so pre-
cisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in such
particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from it. The de-
gree and direction of every motion is, by the laws of nature, prescribed
with such exactness that a living creature may as soon arise from the
shock of two bodies in motion in any other degree or direction than what
is actually produced by it. Would we, therefore, form a just and precise
idea of necessity, we must consider whence that idea arises when we
apply it to the operation of bodies.
It seems evident that, if all the scenes of nature were continually
shifted in such a manner that no two events bore any resemblance to
each other, but every object was entirely new, without any similitude to
whatever had been seen before, we should never, in that case, have at-
tained the least idea of necessity, or of a connexion among these objects.
We might say, upon such a supposition, that one object or event has
followed another; not that one was produced by the other. The relation
of cause and effect must be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and
reasoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that mo-
ment, be at an end; and the memory and senses remain the only canals,
by which the knowledge of any real existence could possibly have ac-
cess to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation arises
entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where
similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is deter-
mined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other.
These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity, which we
ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects,
and the consequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of
any necessity or connexion.
If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever allowed, without
any doubt or hesitation, that these two circumstances take place in the
voluntary actions of men, and in the operations of mind; it must follow,
that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of necessity, and that
they have hitherto disputed, merely for not understanding each other.
65. As to the first circumstance, the constant and regular conjunc-
tion of similar events, we may possibly satisfy ourselves by the follow-58/David Hume
ing considerations. It is universally acknowledged that there is a great
uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that
human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations.
The same motives always produce the same actions: The same events
follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friend-
ship, generosity, public spirit: these passions, mixed in various degrees,
and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the
world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises, which
have ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the senti-
ments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study
well the temper and actions of the French and English: You cannot be
much mistaken in transferring to the former most of the observations
which you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind are so much the
same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or
strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant
and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all variet-
ies of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials
from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with
the regular springs of human action and behaviour. These records of
wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are so many collections of
experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the prin-
ciples of his science, in the same manner as the physician or natural
philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals,
and other external objects, by the experiments which he forms concern-
ing them. Nor are the earth, water, and other elements, examined by
Aristotle, and Hippocrates, more like to those which at present lie under
our observation than the men described by Polybius and Tacitus are to
those who now govern the world.
Should a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us an ac-
count of men, wholly different from any with whom we were ever ac-
quainted; men, who were entirely divested of avarice, ambition, or re-
venge; who knew no pleasure but friendship, generosity, and public spirit;
we should immediately, from these circumstances, detect the falsehood,
and prove him a liar, with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his
narration with stories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies.
And if we would explode any forgery in history, we cannot make use of
a more convincing argument, than to prove, that the actions ascribed to
any person are directly contrary to the course of nature, and that no
human motives, in such circumstances, could ever induce him to such aEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/59
conduct. The veracity of Quintus Curtius is as much to be suspected
when he describes the supernatural courage of Alexander, by which he
was hurried on singly to attack multitudes, as when he describes his
supernatural force and activity, by which he was able to resist them. So
readily and universally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human mo-
tives and actions as well as in the operations of body.
Hence likewise the benefit of that experience, acquired by long life
and a variety of business and company, in order to instruct us in the
principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as
speculation. By means of this guide, we mount up to the knowledge of
men’s inclinations and motives, from their actions, expressions, and even
gestures; and again descend to the interpretation of their actions from
our knowledge of their motives and inclinations. The general observa-
tions treasured up by a course of experience, give us the clue of human
nature, and teach us to unravel all its intricacies. Pretexts and appear-
ances no longer deceive us. Public declarations pass for the specious
colouring of a cause. And though virtue and honour be allowed their
proper weight and authority, that perfect disinterestedness, so often pre-
tended to, is never expected in multitudes and parties; seldom in their
leaders; and scarcely even in individuals of any rank or station. But
were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment
which we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous, it were im-
possible to collect any general observations concerning mankind; and
no experience, however accurately digested by reflection, would ever
serve to any purpose. Why is the aged husband-man more skilful in his
calling than the young beginner but because there is a certain uniformity
in the operation of the sun, rain, and earth towards the production of
vegetables; and experience teaches the old practitioner the rules by which
this operation is governed and directed.
66. We must not, however, expect that this uniformity of human
actions should be carried to such a length as that all men, in the same
circumstances, will always act precisely in the same manner, without
making any allowance for the diversity of characters, prejudices, and
opinions. Such a uniformity in every particular, is found in no part of
nature. On the contrary, from observing the variety of conduct in differ-
ent men, we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims, which still
suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity.
Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries?
We learn thence the great force of custom and education, which mould60/David Hume
the human mind from its infancy and form it into a fixed and established
character. Is the behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that
of the other? Is it thence we become acquainted with the different char-
acters which nature has impressed upon the sexes, and which she pre-
serves with constancy and regularity? Are the actions of the same per-
son much diversified in the different periods of his life, from infancy to
old age? This affords room for many general observations concerning
the gradual change of our sentiments and inclinations, and the different
maxims which prevail in the different ages of human creatures. Even
the characters, which are peculiar to each individual, have a uniformity
in their influence; otherwise our acquaintance with the persons and our
observation of their conduct could never teach us their dispositions, or
serve to direct our behaviour with regard to them.
67. I grant it possible to find some actions, which seem to have no
regular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to all
the measures of conduct which have ever been established for the gov-
ernment of men. But if we would willingly know what judgement should
be formed of such irregular and extraordinary actions, we may consider
the sentiments commonly entertained with regard to those irregular events
which appear in the course of nature, and the operations of external
objects. All causes are not conjoined to their usual effects with like
uniformity. An artificer, who handles only dead matter, may be disap-
pointed of his aim, as well as the politician, who directs the conduct of
sensible and intelligent agents.
The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance,
attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes
as makes the latter often fail of their usual influence; though they meet
with no impediment in their operation. But philosophers, observing that,
almost in every part of nature, there is contained a vast variety of springs
and principles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness or remote-
ness, find, that it is at least possible the contrariety of events may not
proceed from any contingency in the cause, but from the secret opera-
tion of contrary causes. This possibility is converted into certainty by
farther observation, when they remark that, upon an exact scrutiny, a
contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes, and pro-
ceeds from their mutual opposition. A peasant can give no better reason
for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say that it does not com-
monly go right: But an artist easily perceives that the same force in the
spring or pendulum has always the same influence on the wheels; butEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/61
fails of its usual effect, perhaps by reason of a grain of dust, which puts
a stop to the whole movement. From the observation of several parallel
instances, philosophers form a maxim that the connexion between all
causes and effects is equally necessary, and that its seeming uncertainty
in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes.
Thus, for instance, in the human body, when the usual symptoms of
health or sickness disappoint our expectation; when medicines operate
not with their wonted powers; when irregular events follow from any
particular cause; the philosopher and physician are not surprised at the
matter, nor are ever tempted to deny, in general, the necessity and uni-
formity of those principles by which the animal economy is conducted.
They know that a human body is a mighty complicated machine: That
many secret powers lurk in it, which are altogether beyond our compre-
hension: That to us it must often appear very uncertain in its operations:
And that therefore the irregular events, which outwardly discover them-
selves, can be no proof that the laws of nature are not observed with the
greatest regularity in its internal operations and government.
68. The philosopher, if he be consistent, must apply the same rea-
soning to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents. The most ir-
regular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted
for by those who know every particular circumstance of their character
and situation. A person of an obliging disposition gives a peevish an-
swer: But he has the toothache, or has not dined. A stupid fellow discov-
ers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage: But he has met with a sudden
piece of good fortune. Or even when an action, as sometimes happens,
cannot be particularly accounted for, either by the person himself or by
others; we know, in general, that the characters of men are, to a certain
degree, inconstant and irregular. This is, in a manner, the constant char-
acter of human nature; though it be applicable, in a more particular
manner, to some persons who have no fixed rule for their conduct, but
proceed in a continued course of caprice and inconstancy. The internal
principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notwithstand-
ing these seeming irregularities; in the same manner as the winds, rain,
clouds, and other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed
by steady principles; though not easily discoverable by human sagacity
and enquiry.
69. Thus it appears, not only that the conjunction between motives
and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the
cause and effect in any part of nature; but also that this regular conjunc-62/David Hume
tion has been universally acknowledged among mankind, and has never
been the subject of dispute, either in philosophy or common life. Now,
as it is from past experience that we draw all inferences concerning the
future, and as we conclude that objects will always be conjoined to-
gether which we find to have always been conjoined; it may seem super-
fluous to prove that this experienced uniformity in human actions is a
source whence we draw inferences concerning them. But in order to
throw the argument into a greater variety of lights we shall also insist,
though briefly, on this latter topic.
The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce
any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without
some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it
answer fully the intention of the agent. The poorest artificer, who labours
alone, expects at least the protection of the magistrate, to ensure him the
enjoyment of the fruits of his labour. He also expects that, when he
carries his goods to market, and offers them at a reasonable price, he
shall find purchasers, and shall be able, by the money he acquires, to
engage others to supply him with those commodities which are requisite
for his subsistence. In proportion as men extend their dealings, and ren-
der their intercourse with others more complicated, they always com-
prehend, in their schemes of life, a greater variety of voluntary actions,
which they expect, from the proper motives, to co-operate with their
own. In all these conclusions they take their measures from past experi-
ence, in the same manner as in their reasonings concerning external
objects; and firmly believe that men, as well as all the elements, are to
continue, in their operations, the same that they have ever found them.
A manufacturer reckons upon the labour of his servants for the execu-
tion of any work as much as upon the tools which he employs, and
would be equally surprised were his expectations disappointed. In short,
this experimental inference and reasoning concerning the actions of oth-
ers enters so much into human life that no man, while awake, is ever a
moment without employing it. Have we not reason, therefore, to affirm
that all mankind have always agreed in the doctrine of necessity accord-
ing to the foregoing definition and explication of it?
70. Nor have philosophers ever entertained a different opinion from
the people in this particular. For, not to mention that almost every action
of their life supposes that opinion, there are even few of the speculative
parts of learning to which it is not essential. What would become of
history, had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian accord-Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/63
ing to the experience which we have had of mankind? How could poli-
tics be a science, if laws and forms of government had not a uniform
influence upon society? Where would be the foundation of morals, if
particular characters had no certain or determinate power to produce
particular sentiments, and if these sentiments had no constant operation
on actions? And with what pretence could we employ our criticism upon
any poet or polite author, if we could not pronounce the conduct and
sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters,
and in such circumstances? It seems almost impossible, therefore, to
engage either in science or action of any kind without acknowledging
the doctrine of necessity, and this inference from motive to voluntary
actions, from characters to conduct.
And indeed, when we consider how aptly natural and moral evi-
dence link together, and form only one chain of argument, we shall make
no scruple to allow that they are of the same nature, and derived from
the same principles. A prisoner who has neither money nor interest,
discovers the impossibility of his escape, as well when he considers the
obstinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars with which he is sur-
rounded; and, in all attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to work
upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the
other. The same prisoner, when conducted to the scaffold, foresees his
death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards, as from
the operation of the axe or wheel. His mind runs along a certain train of
ideas: The refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape; the action of
the executioner; the separation of the head and body; bleeding, convul-
sive motions, and death. Here is a connected chain of natural causes and
voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference between them in pass-
ing from one link to another: Nor is less certain of the future event than
if it were connected with the objects present to the memory or senses, by
a train of causes, cemented together by what we are pleased to call a
physical necessity. The same experienced union has the same effect on
the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volition, and actions;
or figure and motion. We may change the name of things; but their
nature and their operation on the understanding never change.
Were a man, whom I know to be honest and opulent, and with whom
I live in intimate friendship, to come into my house, where I am sur-
rounded with my servants, I rest assured that he is not to stab me before
he leaves it in order to rob me of my silver standish; and I no more
suspect this event than the falling of the house itself, which is new, and64/David Hume
solidly built and founded.- But he may have been seized with a sudden
and unknown frenzy.- So may a sudden earthquake arise, and shake and
tumble my house about my ears. I shall therefore change the supposi-
tions. I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to put his hand
into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed: And this event, I think
I can foretell with the same assurance, as that, if he throw himself out at
the window, and meet with no obstruction, he will not remain a moment
suspended in the air. No suspicion of an unknown frenzy can give the
least possibility to the former event, which is so contrary to all the known
principles of human nature. A man who at noon leaves his purse full of
gold on the pavement at Charing Cross, may as well expect that it will
fly away like a feather, as that he will find it untouched an hour after.
Above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a similar
nature, attended with more or less degrees of certainty proportioned to
our experience of the usual conduct of mankind in such particular situ-
ations.
71. I have frequently considered, what could possibly be the reason
why all mankind, though they have ever, without hesitation, acknowl-
edged the doctrine of necessity in their whole practice and reasoning,
have yet discovered such a reluctance to acknowledge it in words, and
have rather shown a propensity, in all ages, to profess the contrary opin-
ion. The matter, I think, may be accounted for after the following man-
ner. If we examine the operations of body, and the production of effects
from their causes, we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us
farther in our knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that
particular objects are constantly conjoined together, and that the mind is
carried, by a customary transition, from the appearance of one to the
belief of the other. But though this conclusion concerning human igno-
rance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject, men still
entertain a strong propensity to believe that they penetrate farther into
the powers of nature, and perceive something like a necessary connexion
between the cause and the effect. When again they turn their reflections
towards the operations of their own minds, and feel no such connexion
of the motive and the action; they are thence apt to suppose, that there is
a difference between the effects which result from material force, and
those which arise from thought and intelligence. But being once con-
vinced that we know nothing farther of causation of any kind than merely
the constant conjunction of objects, and the consequent inference of the
mind from one to another, and finding that these two circumstances areEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/65
universally allowed to have place in voluntary actions; we may be more
easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes. And though
this reasoning may contradict the systems of many philosophers, in as-
cribing necessity to the determinations of the will, we shall find, upon
reflection, that they dissent from it in words only, not in their real senti-
ment. Necessity, according to the sense in which it is here taken, has
never yet been rejected, nor can ever, I think, be rejected by any philoso-
pher. It may only, perhaps, be pretended that the mind can perceive, in
the operations of matter, some farther connexion between the cause and
effect; and connexion that has not place in voluntary actions of intelli-
gent beings. Now whether it be so or not, can only appear upon exami-
nation; and it is incumbent on these philosophers to make good their
assertion, by defining or describing that necessity, and pointing it out to
us in the operations of material causes.
72. It would seem, indeed, that men begin at the wrong end of this
question concerning liberty and necessity, when they enter upon it by
examining the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understanding,
and the operations of the will. Let them first discuss a more simple
question, namely, the operations of body and of brute unintelligent mat-
ter; and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and ne-
cessity, except that of a constant conjunction of objects, and subsequent
inference of the mind from one to another. If these circumstances form,
in reality, the whole of that necessity, which we conceive in matter, and
if these circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place in
the operations of the mind, the dispute is at an end; at least, must be
owned to be thenceforth merely verbal. But as long as we will rashly
suppose, that we have some farther idea of necessity and causation in
the operations of external objects; at the same time, that we can find
nothing farther in the voluntary actions of the mind; there is no possibil-
ity of bringing the question to any determinate issue, while we proceed
upon so erroneous a supposition. The only method of undeceiving us is
to mount up higher; to examine the narrow extent of science when ap-
plied to material causes; and to convince ourselves that all we know of
them is the constant conjunction and inference above mentioned. We
may, perhaps, find that it is with difficulty we are induced to fix such
narrow limits to human understanding: But we can afterwards find no
difficulty when we come to apply this doctrine to the actions of the will.
For as it is evident that these have a regular conjunction with motives
and circumstances and characters, and as we always draw inferences66/David Hume
from one to the other, we must be obliged to acknowledge in words that
necessity, which we have already avowed, in every deliberation of our
lives, and in every step of our conduct and behaviour.17
73. But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the
question of liberty and necessity; the most contentious question of meta-
physics, the most contentious science; it will not require many words to
prove, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as
well as in that of necessity, and that the whole dispute, in this respect
also, has been hitherto merely verbal. For what is meant by liberty,
when applied to voluntary actions? We cannot surely mean that actions
have so little connexion with motives, inclinations, and circumstances,
that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the
other, and that one affords no inference by which we can conclude the
existence of the other. For these are plain and acknowledged matters of
fact. By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting,
according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to re-
main at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this
hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is
not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then, is no subject of dispute.
74. Whatever definition we may give of liberty, we should be care-
ful to observe two requisite circumstances; first, that it be consistent
with plain matter of fact; secondly, that it be consistent with itself. If we
observe these circumstances, and render our definition intelligible, I am
persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to
it.
It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its
existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative
word, and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in
nature. But it is pretended that some causes are necessary, some not
necessary. Here then is the advantage of definitions. Let any one define
a cause, without comprehending, as a part of the definition, a necessary
connexion with its effect; and let him show distinctly the origin of the
idea, expressed by the definition; and I shall readily give up the whole
controversy. But if the foregoing explication of the matter be received,
this must be absolutely impracticable. Had not objects a regular con-
junction with each other, we should never have entertained any notion of
cause and effect; and this regular conjunction produces that inference of
the understanding, which is the only connexion, that we can have any
comprehension of. Whoever attempts a definition of cause, exclusive ofEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/67
these circumstances, will be obliged either to employ unintelligible terms
or such as are synonymous to the term which he endeavours to define.18
And if the definition above mentioned be admitted; liberty, when op-
posed to necessity, not to constraint, is the same thing with chance;
which is universally allowed to have no existence.
Part II.
75. There is no method of reasoning more common, and yet none more
blameable, than, in philosophical disputes, to endeavour the refutation
of any hypothesis, by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to reli-
gion and morality. When any opinion leads to absurdities, it is certainly
false; but it is not certain that an opinion is false, because it is of danger-
ous consequence. Such topics, therefore, ought entirely to be forborne;
as serving nothing to the discovery of truth, but only to make the person
of an antagonist odious. This I observe in general, without pretending to
draw any advantage from it. I frankly submit to an examination of this
kind, and shall venture to affirm that the doctrines, both of necessity and
of liberty, as above explained, are not only consistent with morality, but
are absolutely essential to its support.
Necessity may be defined two ways, conformably to the two defini-
tions of cause, of which it makes an essential part. It consists either in
the constant conjunction of like objects or in the inference of the under-
standing from one object to another. Now necessity, in both these senses,
(which, indeed, are at bottom the same) has universally, though tacitly,
in the schools, in the pulpit, and in common life, been allowed to belong
to the will of man; and no one has ever pretended to deny that we can
draw inferences concerning human actions, and that those inferences
are founded on the experienced union of like actions, with like motives,
inclinations, and circumstances. The only particular in which any one
can differ, is, that either, perhaps, he will refuse to give the name of
necessity to this property of human actions: But as long as the meaning
is understood, I hope the word can do no harm: Or that he will maintain
it possible to discover something farther in the operations of matter. But
this, it must be acknowledged, can be of no consequence to morality or
religion, whatever it may be to natural philosophy or metaphysics. We
may here be mistaken in asserting that there is no idea of any other
necessity or connexion in the actions of body: But surely we ascribe
nothing to the actions of the mind, but what everyone does, and must
readily allow of. We change no circumstance in the received orthodox68/David Hume
system with regard to the will, but only in that with regard to material
objects and causes. Nothing, therefore, can be more innocent, at least,
than this doctrine.
76. All laws being founded on rewards and punishments, it is sup-
posed as a fundamental principle, that these motives have a regular and
uniform influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent
the evil actions. We may give to this influence what name we please; but
as it is usually conjoined with the action, it must be esteemed a cause,
and be looked upon as an instance of that necessity, which we would
here establish.
The only proper object of hatred or vengeance is a person or crea-
ture, endowed with thought and consciousness; and when any criminal
or injurious actions excite that passion, it is only by their relation to the
person, or connexion with him. Actions are, by their very nature, tem-
porary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in
the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they
can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy if evil. The ac-
tions themselves may be blameable; they may be contrary to all the
rules of morality and religion: But the person is not answerable for them;
and as they proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant,
and leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impossible he can,
upon their account, become the object of punishment or vengeance.
According to the principle, therefore, which denies necessity, and con-
sequently causes, a man is as pure and untainted, after having commit-
ted the most horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his
character anywise concerned in his actions, since they are not derived
from it, and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of
the depravity of the other.
Men are not blamed for such actions as they perform ignorantly and
casually, whatever may be the consequences. Why? but because the
principles of these actions are only momentary, and terminate in them
alone. Men are less blamed for such actions as they perform hastily and
unpremeditately than for such as proceed from deliberation. For what
reason? but because a hasty temper, though a constant cause or prin-
ciple in the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole
character. Again, repentance wipes off every crime, if attended with a
reformation of life and manners. How is this to be accounted for? but by
asserting that actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs
of criminal principles in the mind; and when, by an alteration of theseEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/69
principles, they cease to be just proofs, they likewise cease to be crimi-
nal. But, except upon the doctrine of necessity, they never were just
proofs, and consequently never were criminal.
77. It will be equally easy to prove, and from the same arguments,
that liberty, according to that definition above mentioned, in which all
men agree is also essential to morality, and that no human actions, where
it is wanting, are susceptible of any moral qualities, or can be the ob-
jects either of approbation or dislike. For as actions are objects of our
moral sentiment, so far only as they are indications of the internal char-
acter, passions, and affections; it is impossible that they can give rise
either to praise or blame, where they proceed not from these principles,
but are derived altogether from external violence.
78. I pretend not to have obviated or removed all objections to this
theory, with regard to necessity and liberty. I can foresee other objec-
tions, derived from topics which have not here been treated of. It may be
said, for instance, that, if voluntary actions be subjected to the same
laws of necessity with the operations of matter, there is a continued
chain of necessary causes, preordained and pre-determined, reaching
from the original cause of all to every single volition of every human
creature. No contingency anywhere in the universe; no indifference; no
liberty. While we act, we are, at the same time, acted upon. The ultimate
Author of all our volitions is the Creator of the world, who first be-
stowed motion on this immense machine, and placed all beings in that
particular position, whence every subsequent event, by an inevitable
necessity, must result. Human actions, therefore, either can have no moral
turpitude at all, as proceeding from so good a cause; or if they have any
turpitude, they must involve our Creator in the same guilt, while he is
acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author. For as a man, who
fired a mine, is answerable for all the consequences whether the train he
employed be long or short; so wherever a continued chain of necessary
causes is fixed, that Being, either finite or infinite, who produces the
first, is likewise the author of all the rest, and must both bear the blame
and acquire the praise which belong to them. Our clear and unalterable
ideas of morality establish this rule, upon unquestionable reasons, when
we examine the consequences of any human action; and these reasons
must still have greater force when applied to the volitions and intentions
of a Being infinitely wise and powerful. Ignorance or importence may
be pleaded for so limited a creature as man; but those imperfections
have no place in our Creator. He foresaw, he ordained, he intended all70/David Hume
those actions of men, which we so rashly pronounce criminal. And we
must therefore conclude, either that they are not criminal, or that the
Deity, not man, is accountable for them. But as either of these positions
is absurd and impious, it follows, that the doctrine from which they are
deduced cannot possibly be true, as being liable to all the same objec-
tions. An absurd consequence, if necessary, proves the original doctrine
to be absurd; in the same manner as criminal actions render criminal the
original cause, if the connexion between them be necessary and evitable.
This objection consists of two parts, which we shall examine sepa-
rately; First, that, if human actions can be traced up, by a necessary
chain, to the Deity, they can never be criminal; on account of the infinite
perfection of that Being from whom they are derived, and who can in-
tend nothing but what is altogether good and laudable. Or, Secondly, if
they be criminal, we must retract the attribute of perfection, which we
ascribe to the Deity, and must acknowledge him to be the ultimate au-
thor of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures.
79. The answer to the first objection seems obvious and convincing.
There are many philosophers who, after an exact scrutiny of all the
phenomena of nature, conclude, that the WHOLE, considered as one
system, is, in every period of its existence, ordered with perfect benevo-
lence; and that the utmost possible happiness will, in the end, result to
all created beings, without any mixture of positive or absolute ill or
misery. Every physical ill, say they, makes an essential part of this be-
nevolent system, and could not possibly be removed, even by the Deity
himself, considered as a wise agent, without giving entrance to greater
ill, or excluding greater good, which will result from it. From this theory,
some philosophers, and the ancient Stoics among the rest, derived a
topic of consolation under all afflictions, while they taught their pupils
that those ills under which they laboured were, in reality, goods to the
universe; and that to an enlarged view, which could comprehend the
whole system of nature, every event became an object of joy and exulta-
tion. But though this topic be specious and sublime, it was soon found
in practice weak and ineffectual. You would surely more irritate than
appease a man lying under the racking pains of the gout by preaching
up to him the rectitude of those general laws, which produced the malig-
nant humours in his body, and led them through the proper canals, to the
sinews and nerves, where they now excite such acute torments. These
enlarged views may, for a moment, please the imagination of a specula-
tive man, who is placed in ease and security; but neither can they dwellEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/71
with constancy on his mind, even though undisturbed by the emotions of
pain or passion; much less can they maintain their ground when at-
tacked by such powerful antagonists. The affections take a narrower
and more natural survey of their object; and by an economy, more suit-
able to the infirmity of human minds, regard alone the beings around us,
and are actuated by such events as appear good or ill to the private
system.
80. The case is the same with moral as with physical ill. It cannot
reasonably be supposed, that those remote considerations, which are
found of so little efficacy with regard to one, will have a more powerful
influence with regard to the other. The mind of man is so formed by
nature that, upon the appearance of certain characters, dispositions, and
actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame; nor
are there any emotions more essential to its frame and constitution. The
characters which engage our approbation are chiefly such as contribute
to the peace and security of human society; as the characters which
excite blame are chiefly such as tend to public detriment and distur-
bance: Whence it may reasonably be presumed, that the moral senti-
ments arise, either mediately or immediately, from a reflection of these
opposite interests. What though philosophical meditations establish a
different opinion or conjecture; that everything is right with regard to
the whole, and that the qualities, which disturb society, are, in the main,
as beneficial, and are as suitable to the primary intention of nature as
those which more directly promote its happiness and welfare? Are such
remote and uncertain speculations able to counterbalance the sentiments
which arise from the natural and immediate view of the objects? A man
who is robbed of a considerable sum; does he find his vexation for the
loss anywise diminished by these sublime reflections? Why then should
his moral resentment against the crime be supposed incompatible with
them? Or why should not the acknowledgement of a real distinction
between vice and virtue be reconcileable to all speculative systems of
philosophy, as well as that of a real distinction between personal beauty
and deformity? Both these distinctions are founded in the natural senti-
ments of the human mind: And these sentiments are not to be controuled
or altered by any philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever.
81. The second objection admits not of so easy and satisfactory an
answer; nor is it possible to explain distinctly, how the Deity can be the
mediate cause of all the actions of men, without being the author of sin
and moral turpitude. These are mysteries, which mere natural and unas-72/David Hume
sisted reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system she embraces,
she must find herself involved in inextricable difficulties, and even con-
tradictions, at every step which she takes with regard to such subjects.
To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with
prescience; or to defend absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from
being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the power
of philosophy. Happy, if she be thence sensible of her temerity, when she
pries into these sublime mysteries; and leaving a scene so full of obscu-
rities and perplexities, return, with suitable modesty, to her true and
proper province, the examination of common life; where she will find
difficulties enough to employ her enquiries, without launching into so
boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction!
Sect. IX. Of the Reason of Animals
82. All our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a spe-
cies of Analogy, which leads us to expect from any cause the same
events, which we have observed to result from similar causes. Where
the causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference,
drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive: nor does any man
ever entertain a doubt where he sees a piece of iron, that it will have
weight and cohesion of parts; as in all other instances, which have ever
fallen under his observation. But where the objects have not so exact a
similarity, the analogy is less perfect, and the inference is less conclu-
sive; though still it has some force, in proportion to the degree of simi-
larity and resemblance. The anatomical observations, formed upon one
animal, are, by this species of reasoning, extended to all animals; and it
is certain, that when the circulation of the blood, for instance, is clearly
proved to have place in one creature, as a frog, or fish, it forms a strong
presumption, that the same principle has place in all. These analogical
observations may be carried farther, even to this science, of which we
are now treating; and any theory, by which we explain the operations of
the understanding, or the origin and connexion of the passions in man,
will acquire additional authority, if we find, that the same theory is req-
uisite to explain the same phenomena in all other animals. We shall
make trial of this, with regard to the hypothesis, by which we have, in
the foregoing discourse, endeavoured to account for all experimental
reasonings; and it is hoped, that this new point of view will serve to
confirm all our former observations.
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things from experience, and infer, that the same events will always fol-
low from the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted
with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually,
from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, water,
earth, stones, heights, depths, &c., and of the effects which result from
their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here
plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old, who
have learned, by long observation, to avoid what hurt them, and to pur-
sue what gave ease or pleasure. A horse, that has been accustomed to
the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap,
and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old grey-
hound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chace to the younger, and
will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles; nor are the
conjectures, which he forms on this occasion, founded in any thing but
his observation and experience.
This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and educa-
tion on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and punish-
ments, may be taught any course of action, and most contrary to their
natural instincts and propensities. Is it not experience which renders a
dog apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to
beat him? Is is not even experience, which makes him answer to his
name, and infer, from such an arbitrary sound, that you mean him rather
than any of his fellows, and intend to call him, when you pronounce it in
a certain manner, and with a certain tone and accent?
In all these cases, we may observe, that the animal infers some fact
beyond what immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference is
altogether founded on past experience, while the creature expects from
the present object the same consequences, which it has always found in
its observation to result from similar objects.
84. Secondly, It is impossible, that this inference of the animal can
be founded on any process of argument or reasoning, by which he con-
cludes, that like events must follow like objects, and that the course of
nature will always be regular in its operations. For if there be in reality
any arguments of this nature, they surely lie too abstruse for the obser-
vation of such imperfect understandings; since it may well employ the
utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover and ob-
serve them. Animals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences by
reasoning: Neither are children: Neither are the generality of mankind,
in their ordinary actions and conclusions: Neither are philosophers them-74/David Hume
selves, who, in all the active parts of life, are, in the main, the same with
the vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims. Nature must have
provided some other principle, of more ready, and more general use and
application; nor can an operation of such immense consequence in life,
as that of inferring effects from causes, be trusted to the uncertain pro-
cess of reasoning and argumentation. Were this doubtful with regard to
men, it seems to admit of no question with regard to the brute creation;
and the conclusion being once firmly established in the one, we have a
strong presumption, from all the rules of analogy, that it ought to be
universally admitted, without any exception or reserve. It is custom alone,
which engages animals, from every object, that strikes their senses, to
infer its usual attendant, and carries their imagination, from the appear-
ance of the one, to conceive the other, in that particular manner, which
we denominate belief. No other explication can be given of this opera-
tion, in all the higher, as well as lower classes of sensitive beings, which
fall under our notice and observation.19
We shall here endeavour briefly to explain the great difference in
human understandings: After which the reason of the difference between
men and animals will easily be comprehended.
1. When we have lived any time, and have been accustomed to the
uniformity of nature, we acquire a general habit, by which we always
transfer the known to the unknown, and conceive the latter to resemble
the former. By means of this general habitual principle, we regard even
one experiment as the foundation of reasoning, and expect a similar
event with some degree of certainty, where the experiment has been
made accurately, and free from all foreign circumstances. It is therefore
considered as a matter of great importance to observe the consequences
of things; and as one man may very much surpass another in attention
and memory and observation, this will make a very great difference in
their reasoning.
2. Where there is a complication of causes to produce any effect,
one mind may be much larger than another, and better able to compre-
hend the whole system of objects, and to infer justly their consequences.
3. One man is able to carry on a chain of consequences to a greater
length than another.
4. Few men can think long without running into a confusion of ideas,
and mistaking one for another; and there are various degrees of this
infirmity.
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volved in other circumstances, which are foreign and extrinsic. The sepa-
ration of it often requires great attention, accuracy, and subtilty.
6. The forming of general maxims from particular observation is a
very nice operation; and nothing is more usual, from haste or a narrow-
ness of mind, which sees not on all sides, than to commit mistakes in
this particular.
7. When we reason from analogies, the man, who has the greater
experience or the greater promptitude of suggesting analogies, will be
the better reasoner.
8. Byasses from prejudice, education, passion, party, &c. hang more
upon one mind than another.
9. After we have acquired a confidence in human testimony, books
and conversation enlarge much more the sphere of one man’s experience
and thought than those of another.
It would be easy to discover many other circumstances that make a
difference in the understandings of men.
85. But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from
observation, there are also many parts of it, which they derive from the
original hand of nature; which much exceed the share of capacity they
possess on ordinary occasions; and in which they improve, little or noth-
ing, by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate In-
stincts, and are so apt to admire as something very extraordinary, and
inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding. But our
wonder will, perhaps, cease or diminish, when we consider, that the
experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common with beasts,
and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species
of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves;
and in its chief operations, is not directed by any such relations or com-
parisons of ideas, as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties.
Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct, which teaches
a man to avoid the fire; as much as that, which teaches a bird, with such
exactness, the art of incubation, and the whole economy and order of its
nursery.
Sect. X. Of Miracles
Part I.
86. There is, in Dr. Tillotson’s writings, an argument against the real
presence, which is as concise, and elegant, and strong as any argument
can possibly be supposed against a doctrine, so little worthy of a serious76/David Hume
refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned prelate,
that the authority, either of the scripture or of tradition, is founded merely
in the testimony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles
of our Saviour, by which he proved his divine mission. Our evidence,
then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for
the truth of our senses; because, even in the first authors of our religion,
it was no greater; and it is evident it must diminish in passing from them
to their disciples; nor can any one rest such confidence in their testi-
mony, as in the immediate object of his senses. But a weaker evidence
can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real
presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture, it were directly contrary
to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense,
though both the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be
built, carry not such evidence with them as sense; when they are consid-
ered merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to every
one’s breast, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit.
Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which
must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and free
us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, that I have dis-
covered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise
and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delu-
sion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures. For
so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found
in all history, sacred and profane.
87. Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning
matters of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not alto-
gether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. One,
who in our climate, should expect better weather in any week of June
than in one of December, would reason justly, and conformably to ex-
perience; but it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find
himself mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he
would have no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly
informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events,
which we may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not
with like certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are found,
in all countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined together:
Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disap-
point our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of
fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highestEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/77
certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence.
A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In
such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects
the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experi-
ence as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases,
he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the opposite experiments: He
considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments:
to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he
fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call
probability. All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments
and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other,
and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. A
hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, af-
ford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform
experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a
pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the
opposite experiments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller
number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the supe-
rior evidence.
88. To apply these principles to a particular instance; we may ob-
serve that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful,
and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the
testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. This
species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the rela-
tion of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be
sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is
derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of
human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of
witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discover-
able connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw
from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their con-
stant and regular conjunction; it is evident that we ought not to make an
exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose connexion
with any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other. Were not
the memory tenacious to a certain degree; had not men commonly an
inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they not sensible to
shame, when detected in a falsehood: Were not these, I say, discovered
by experience to be qualities, inherent in human nature, we should never
repose the least confidence in human testimony. A man delirious, or78/David Hume
noted for falsehood and villany, has no manner of authority with us.
And as the evidence, derived from witnesses and human testimony,
is founded on past experience, so it varies with the experience, and is
regarded either as a proof or a probability, according as the conjunction
between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been
found to be constant or variable. There are a number of circumstances
to be taken into consideration in all judgements of this kind; and the
ultimate standard, by which we determine all disputes, that may arise
concerning them, is always derived from experience and observation.
Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side, it is attended
with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgements, and with the same
opposition and mutual destruction of argument as in every other kind of
evidence. We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of others. We
balance the opposite circumstances, which cause any doubt or uncer-
tainty; and when we discover a superiority on any side, we incline to it;
but still with a diminution of assurance, in proportion to the force of its
antagonist.
89. This contrariety of evidence, in the present case, may be derived
from several different causes; from the opposition of contrary testimony;
from the character or number of the witnesses; from the manner of their
delivering their testimony; or from the union of all these circumstances.
We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact, when the wit-
nesses contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful
character; when they have an interest in what they affirm; when they
deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the contrary, with too vio-
lent asseverations. There are many other particulars of the same kind,
which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument, derived from
human testimony.
Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours
to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that
case, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a diminution,
greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual. The
reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not de-
rived from any connexion, which we perceive a priori, between testi-
mony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity
between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom
fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experi-
ences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and
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The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree
of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case,
another degree of assurance against the fact, which they endeavour to
establish; from which contradiction there necessarily arises a
counterpoize, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.
I should not believe such a story were it told me by Cato, was a
proverbial saying in Rome, even during the lifetime of that philosophi-
cal patriot.20 The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might invalidate
so great an authority.
The Indian prince, who refused to believe the first relations con-
cerning the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required
very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, that arose from a
state of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and which bore so
little analogy to those events, of which he had had constant and uniform
experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were
not conformable to it.21
90. But in order to encrease the probability against the testimony of
witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of
being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the
testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in
that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must pre-
vail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its
antagonist.
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and
unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a
miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument
from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than prob-
able, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended
in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless
it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and
there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to
prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the
common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good
health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though
more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to hap-
pen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because
that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, there-
fore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise
the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience80/David Hume
amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature
of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be
destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof,
which is superior.22
91. The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of
our attention), “That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle,
unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more
miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish; and even in
that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior
only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which re-
mains, after deducting the inferior.” When anyone tells me, that he saw
a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether
it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be de-
ceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I
weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superior-
ity, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the
greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more mi-
raculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he
pretend to command my belief or opinion.
Part II.
92. In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed that the testimony,
upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire
proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy:
But it is easy to shew that we have been a great deal too liberal in our
concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on
so full an evidence.
For first, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested
by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense, educa-
tion, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of
such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any
design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of
mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in
any falsehood; and at the same time, attesting facts performed in such a
public manner and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the
detection unavoidable: All which circumstances are requisite to give us
a full assurance in the testimony of men.
93. Secondly. We may observe in human nature a principle which,
if strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance,Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/81
which we might, from human testimony, have, in any kind of prodigy.
The maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reason-
ings, is, that the objects, of which we have no experience, resemble
those, of which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is
always most probable; and that where there is an opposition of argu-
ments, we ought to give the preference to such as are founded on the
greatest number of past observations. But though, in proceeding by this
rule, we readily reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an
ordinary degree; yet in advancing farther, the mind observes not always
the same rule; but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miracu-
lous, it rather the more readily admits of such a fact, upon account of
that very circumstance, which ought to destroy all its authority. The
passion of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agree-
able emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events,
from which it is derived. And this goes so far, that even those who
cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miracu-
lous events, of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the satis-
faction at second-hand or by rebound, and place a pride and delight in
exciting the admiration of others.
With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers re-
ceived, their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of
wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the
spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of
common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all
pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imag-
ine he sees what has no reality: he may know his narrative to be false,
and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world, for the sake
of promoting so holy a cause: or even where this delusion has not place,
vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates on him more power-
fully than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances; and self-
interest with equal force. His auditors may not have, and commonly
have not, sufficient judgement to canvass his evidence: what judgement
they have, they renounce by principle, in these sublime and mysterious
subjects: or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a
heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations. Their credu-
lity increases his impudence: and his impudence overpowers their cre-
dulity.
Eloquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason or
reflection; but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the affections,82/David Hume
captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their understanding. Hap-
pily, this pitch it seldom attains. But what a Tully or a Demosthenes
could scarcely effect over a Roman or Athenian audience, every Capu-
chin, every itinerant or stationary teacher can perform over the general-
ity of mankind, and in a higher degree, by touching such gross and
vulgar passions.
The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies, and super-
natural events, which, in all ages, have either been detected by contrary
evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove suffi-
ciently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the
marvellous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all rela-
tions of this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with regard
to the most common and most credible events. For instance: There is no
kind of report which rises so easily, and spreads so quickly, especially in
country places and provincial towns, as those concerning marriages;
insomuch that two young persons of equal condition never see each
other twice, but the whole neighbourhood immediately join them to-
gether. The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting, of propa-
gating it, and of being the first reporters of it, spreads the intelligence.
And this is so well known, that no man of sense gives attention to these
reports, till he find them confirmed by some greater evidence. Do not
the same passions, and others still stronger, incline the generality of
mankind to believe and report, with the greatest vehemence and assur-
ance, all religious miracles?
94. Thirdly. It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural
and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound among
ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given
admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received
them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with
that inviolable sanction and authority, which always attend received
opinions. When we peruse the first histories of all nations, we are apt to
imagine ourselves transported into some new world; where the whole
frame of nature is disjointed, and every element performs its operations
in a different manner, from what it does at present. Battles, revolutions,
pestilence, famine and death, are never the effect of those natural causes,
which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles, judgements, quite ob-
scure the few natural events, that are intermingled with them. But as the
former grow thinner every page, in proportion as we advance nearer the
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pernatural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of
mankind towards the marvellous, and that, though this inclination may
at intervals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never be
thoroughly extirpated from human nature.
It is strange, a judicious reader is apt to say, upon the perusal of
these wonderful historians, that such prodigious events never happen in
our days. But it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in all
ages. You must surely have seen instances enough of that frailty. You
have yourself heard many such marvellous relations started, which, be-
ing treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at last been
abandoned even by the vulgar. Be assured, that those renowned lies,
which have spread and flourished to such a monstrous height, arose
from like beginnings; but being sown in a more proper soil, shot up at
last into prodigies almost equal to those which they relate.
It was a wise policy in that false prophet, Alexander, who though
now forgotten, was once so famous, to lay the first scene of his impos-
tures in Paphlagonia, where, as Lucian tells us, the people were ex-
tremely ignorant and stupid, and ready to swallow even the grossest
delusion. People at a distance, who are weak enough to think the matter
at all worth enquiry, have no opportunity of receiving better informa-
tion. The stories come magnified to them by a hundred circumstances.
Fools are industrious in propagating the imposture; while the wise and
learned are contented, in general, to deride its absurdity, without in-
forming themselves of the particular facts, by which it may be distinctly
refuted. And thus the impostor above mentioned was enabled to pro-
ceed, from his ignorant Paphlagonians, to the enlisting of votaries, even
among the Grecian philosophers, and men of the most eminent rank and
distinction in Rome: nay, could engage the attention of that sage em-
peror Marcus Aurelius; so far as to make him trust the success of a
military expedition to his delusive prophecies.
The advantages are so great, of starting an imposture among an
ignorant people, that, even though the delusion should be too gross to
impose on the generality of them (which, though seldom, is sometimes
the case) it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries,
than if the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and
knowledge. The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry
the report abroad. None of their countrymen have a large correspon-
dence, or sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the
delusion. Men’s inclination to the marvellous has full opportunity to84/David Hume
display itself. And thus a story, which is universally exploded in the
place where it was first started, shall pass for certain at a thousand
miles distance. But had Alexander fixed his residence at Athens, the
philosophers of that renowned mart of learning had immediately spread,
throughout the whole Roman empire, their sense of the matter; which,
being supported by so great authority, and displayed by all the force of
reason and eloquence, had entirely opened the eyes of mankind. It is
true; Lucian, passing by chance through Paphlagonia, had an opportu-
nity of performing this good office. But, though much to be wished, it
does not always happen, that every Alexander meets with a Lucian,
ready to expose and detect his impostures.
95. I may add as a fourth reason, which diminishes the authority of
prodigies, that there is no testimony for any, even those which have not
been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of
witnesses; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of testimony,
but the testimony destroys itself. To make this the better understood, let
us consider, that, in matters of religion, whatever is different is con-
trary; and that it is impossible the religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey,
of Siam, and of China should, all of them, be established on any solid
foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought in
any of these religions (and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct
scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so
has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other
system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of
those miracles, on which that system was established; so that all the
prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and
the evidences of these prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to
each other. According to this method of reasoning, when we believe any
miracle of Mahomet or his successors, we have for our warrant the
testimony of a few barbarous Arabians: And on the other hand, we are
to regard the authority of Titus Livius, Plutarch, Tacitus, and, in short,
of all the authors and witnesses, Grecian, Chinese, and Roman Catho-
lic, who have related any miracle in their particular religion; I say, we
are to regard their testimony in the same light as if they had mentioned
that Mahometan miracle, and had in express terms contradicted it, with
the same certainty as they have for the miracle they relate. This argu-
ment may appear over subtile and refined; but is not in reality different
from the reasoning of a judge, who supposes that the credit of two wit-
nesses, maintaining a crime against any one, is destroyed by the testi-Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/85
mony of two others, who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues
distant, at the same instant when the crime is said to have been commit-
ted.
96. One of the best attested miracles in all profane history, is that
which Tacitus reports of Vespasian, who cured a blind man in Alexan-
dria, by means of his spittle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his
foot; in obedience to a vision of the god Serapis, who had enjoined them
to have recourse to the Emperor, for these miraculous cures. The story
may be seen in that fine historian;23 where every circumstance seems to
add weight to the testimony, and might be displayed at large with all the
force of argument and eloquence, if any one were now concerned to
enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition. The
gravity, solidity, age, and probity of so great an emperor, who, through
the whole course of his life, conversed in a familiar manner with his
friends and courtiers, and never affected those extraordinary airs of di-
vinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius. The historian, a contem-
porary writer, noted for candour and veracity, and withal, the greatest
and most penetrating genius, perhaps, of all antiquity; and so free from
any tendency to credulity, that he even lies under the contrary imputa-
tion, of atheism and profaneness: The persons, from whose authority he
related the miracle, of established character for judgement and veracity,
as we may well presume; eye-witnesses of the fact, and confirming their
testimony, after the Flavian family was despoiled of the empire, and
could no longer give any reward, as the price of a lie. Utrumque, qui
interfuere, nunc quoque memorant, postquam nullum mendacio pretium.
To which if we add the public nature of the facts, as related, it will
appear, that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and
so palpable a falsehood.
There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal de Retz, which
may well deserve our consideration. When that intriguing politician fled
into Spain, to avoid the persecution of his enemies, he passed through
Saragossa, the capital of Aragon, where he was shewn, in the cathedral,
a man, who had served seven years as a doorkeeper, and was well known
to every body in town, that had ever paid his devotions at that church.
He had been seen, for so long a time, wanting a leg; but recovered that
limb by the rubbing of holy oil upon the stump; and the cardinal assures
us that he saw him with two legs. This miracle was vouched by all the
canons of the church; and the whole company in town were appealed to
for a confirmation of the fact; whom the cardinal found, by their zealous86/David Hume
devotion, to be thorough believers of the miracle. Here the relater was
also contemporary to the supposed prodigy, of an incredulous and liber-
tine character, as well as of great genius; the miracle of so singular a
nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit, and the witnesses very
numerous, and all of them, in a manner, spectators of the fact, to which
they gave their testimony. And what adds mightily to the force of the
evidence, and may double our surprise on this occasion, is, that the
cardinal himself, who relates the story, seems not to give any credit to it,
and consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in the holy
fraud. He considered justly, that it was not requisite, in order to reject a
fact of this nature, to be able accurately to disprove the testimony, and
to trace its falsehood, through all the circumstances of knavery and
credulity which produced it. He knew, that, as this was commonly alto-
gether impossible at any small distance of time and place; so was it
extremely difficult, even where one was immediately present, by reason
of the bigotry, ignorance, cunning, and roguery of a great part of man-
kind. He therefore concluded, like a just reasoner, that such an evidence
carried falsehood upon the very face of it, and that a miracle, supported
by any human testimony, was more properly a subject of derision than
of argument.
There surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to
one person, than those, which were lately said to have been wrought in
France upon the tomb of Abbe Paris, the famous Jansenist, with whose
sanctity the people were so long deluded. The curing of the sick, giving
hearing to the deaf, and sight to the blind, were every where talked of as
the usual effects of that holy sepulchre. But what is more extraordinary;
many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the spot, before
judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit and dis-
tinction, in a learned age, and on the most eminent theatre that is now in
the world. Nor is this all: a relation of them was published and dispersed
every where; nor were the Jesuits, though a learned body, supported by
the civil magistrate, and determined enemies to those opinions, in whose
favour the miracles were said to have been wrought, ever able distinctly
to refute or detect them. Where shall we find such a number of circum-
stances, agreeing to the corroboration of one fact? And what have we to
oppose to such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or
miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? And this surely, in
the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a sufficient
refutation.Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/87
97. Is the consequence just, because some human testimony has the
utmost force and authority in some cases, when it relates the battle of
Philippi or Pharsalia for instance; that therefore all kinds of testimony
must, in all cases, have equal force and authority? Suppose that the
Caesarean and Pompeian factions had, each of them, claimed the vic-
tory in these battles, and that the historians of each party had uniformly
ascribed the advantage to their own side; how could mankind, at this
distance, have been able to determine between them? The contrariety is
equally strong between the miracles related by Herodotus or Plutarch,
and those delivered by Mariana, Bede, or any monkish historian.
The wise lend a very academic faith to every report which favours
the passion of the reporter; whether it magnifies his country, his family,
or himself, or in any other way strikes in with his natural inclinations
and propensities. But what greater temptation than to appear a mission-
ary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven? Who would not encounter
many dangers and difficulties, in order to attain so sublime a character?
Or if, by the help of vanity and a heated imagination, a man has first
made a convert of himself, and entered seriously into the delusion I who
ever scruples to make use of pious frauds, in support of so holy and
meritorious a cause?
The smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame; because
the materials are always prepared for it. The avidum genus auricularum,24
the gazing populace, receive greedily, without examination, whatever
sooths superstition, and promotes wonder.
How many stories of this nature have in all ages, been detected and
exploded in their infancy? How many more have been celebrated for a
time, and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion? Where such
reports, therefore, fly about, the solution of the phenomenon is obvious;
and we in conformity to regular experience and observation, when we
account for it by the known and natural principles of credulity and delu-
sion. And shall we, rather than have a recourse to so natural a solution,
allow of a miraculous violation of the most established laws of nature?
I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in any
private or even public history, at the place, where it is said to happen;
much more when the scene is removed to ever so small a distance. Even
a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy, and judgement,
which they can employ, find themselves often at a loss to distinguish
between truth and falsehood in the most recent actions. But the matter
never comes to any issue, if trusted to the common method of alterca-88/David Hume
tions and debate and flying rumours; especially when men’s passions
have taken part on either side.
In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned commonly
esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard.
And when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat, in order to
undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records
and witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished beyond
recovery.
No means of detection remain, but those which must be drawn from
the very testimony itself of the reporters: and these, though always suf-
ficient with the judicious and knowing, are commonly too fine to fall
under the comprehension of the vulgar.
98. Upon the whole, then, it appears, that no testimony for any kind
of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof; and
that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by
another proof, derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would
endeavour to establish. It is experience only, which gives authority to
human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the
laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are con-
trary, we have nothing to do but substract the one from the other, and
embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that assurance
which arises from the remainder. But according to the principle here
explained, this substraction, with regard to all popular religions, amounts
to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim,
that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and
make it a just foundation for any such system of religion.
99. I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say,
that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a
system of religion. For I own, that otherwise, there may possibly be
miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to
admit of proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be im-
possible to find any such in all the records of history. Thus, suppose all
authors, in all languages, agree, that, from the first of January 1600,
there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days: suppose
that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively
among the people: that all travellers, who return from foreign countries,
bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or
contradiction: it is evident, that our present philosophers, instead of
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the causes whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and dis-
solution of nature, is an event rendered probable by so many analogies,
that any phenomenon, which seems to have a tendency towards that
catastrophe, comes within the reach of human testimony, if that testi-
mony be very extensive and uniform.
But suppose, that all the historians who treat of England, should
agree, that, on the first of January 1600, Queen Elizabeth died; that
both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the
whole court, as is usual with persons of her rank; that her successor was
acknowledged and proclaimed by the parliament; and that, after being
interred a month, she again appeared, resumed the throne, and governed
England for three years: I must confess that I should be surprised at the
concurrence of so many odd circumstances, but should not have the
least inclination to believe so miraculous an event. I should not doubt of
her pretended death, and of those other public circumstances that fol-
lowed it: I should only assert it to have been pretended, and that it nei-
ther was, nor possibly could be real. You would in vain object to me the
difficulty, and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an affair of
such consequence; the wisdom and solid judgement of that renowned
queen; with the little or no advantage which she could reap from so poor
an artifice: All this might astonish me; but I would still reply, that the
knavery and folly of men are such common phenomena, that I should
rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concur-
rence, than admit of so signal a violation of the laws of nature.
But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion;
men, in all ages, have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of
that kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat,
and sufficient, with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the
fact, but even reject it without farther examination. Though the Being to
whom the miracle is ascribed, be, in this case, Almighty, it does not,
upon that account, become a whit more probable; since it is impossible
for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Being, otherwise than
from the experience which we have of his productions, in the usual
course of nature. This still reduces us to past observation, and obliges
us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of
men, with those of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles, in
order to judge which of them is most likely and probable. As the viola-
tions of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious
miracles, than in that concerning any other matter of fact; this must90/David Hume
diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and make us
form a general resolution, never to lend any attention to it, with what-
ever specious pretence it may be covered.
Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of reason-
ing. “We ought,” says he, “to make a collection or particular history of
all monsters and prodigious births or productions, and in a word of
everything new, rare, and extraordinary in nature. But this must be done
with the most severe scrutiny, lest we depart from truth. Above all,
every relation must be considered as suspicious, which depends in any
degree upon religion, as the prodigies of Livy: And no less so, every-
thing that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchemy, or
such authors, who seem, all of them, to have an unconquerable appetite
for falsehood and fable.”25
100. I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here de-
livered, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or
disguised enemies to the Christian Religion, who have undertaken to
defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is
founded on Faith, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it to
put it to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure. To make this
more evident, let us examine those miracles, related in scripture; and not
to lose ourselves in too wide a field, let us confine ourselves to such as
we find in the Pentateuch, which we shall examine, according to the
principles of these pretended Christians, not as the word or testimony of
God himself, but as the production of a mere human writer and histo-
rian. Here then we are first to consider a book, presented to us by a
barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age when they were still
more barbarous, and in all probability long after the facts which it re-
lates, corroborated by no concurring testimony, and resembling those
fabulous accounts, which every nation gives of its origin. Upon reading
this book, we find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an account
of a state of the world and of human nature entirely different from the
present: Of our fall from that state: Of the age of man, extended to near
a thousand years: Of the destruction of the world by a deluge: Of the
arbitrary choice of one people, as the favourites of heaven; and that
people the countrymen of the author: Of their deliverance from bondage
by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable: I desire anyone to lay his
hand upon his heart, and after a serious consideration declare, whether
he thinks that the falsehood of such a book, supported by such a testi-
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it relates; which is, however, necessary to make it be received, accord-
ing to the measures of probability above established.
101. What we have said of miracles may be applied, without any
variation, to prophecies; and indeed, all prophecies are real miracles,
and as such only, can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did
not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretell future events, it
would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine
mission or authority from heaven. So that, upon the whole, we may
conclude, that the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with
miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable
person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its
veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of
a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles
of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is
most contrary to custom and experience.
Sect. XI. Of a particular Providence and of a
future State
102. I was lately engaged in conversation with a friend who loves scep-
tical paradoxes; where, though he advanced many principles, of which I
can by no means approve, yet as they seem to be curious, and to bear
some relation to the chain of reasoning carried on throughout this en-
quiry, I shall here copy them from my memory as accurately as I can, in
order to submit them to the judgement of the reader.
Our conversation began with my admiring the singular good for-
tune of philosophy, which, as it requires entire liberty above all other
privileges, and chiefly flourishes from the free opposition of sentiments
and argumentation, received its first birth in an age and country of free-
dom and toleration, and was never cramped, even in its most extrava-
gant principles, by any creeds, concessions, or penal statutes. For, ex-
cept the banishment of Protagoras, and the death of Socrates, which last
event proceeded partly from other motives, there are scarcely any in-
stances to be met with, in ancient history, of this bigotted jealousy, with
which the present age is so much infested. Epicurus lived at Athens to
an advanced age, in peace and tranquillity: Epicureans26 were even ad-
mitted to receive the sacerdotal character, and to officiate at the altar, in
the most sacred rites of the established religion: And the public encour-
agement27 of pensions and salaries was afforded equally, by the wisest
of all the Roman emperors,28 to the professors of every sect of philoso-92/David Hume
phy. How requisite such kind of treatment was to philosophy, in her
early youth, will easily be conceived, if we reflect, that, even at present,
when she may be supposed more hardy and robust, she bears with much
difficulty the inclemency of the seasons, and those harsh winds of cal-
umny and persecution, which blow upon her.
You admire, says my friend, as the singular good fortune of phi-
losophy, what seems to result from the natural course of things, and to
be unavoidable in every age and nation. This pertinacious bigotry, of
which you complain, as so fatal to philosophy, is really her offspring,
who, after allying with superstition, separates himself entirely from the
interest of his parent, and becomes her most inveterate enemy and per-
secutor. Speculative dogmas of religion, the present occasions of such
furious dispute, could not possibly be conceived or admitted in the early
ages of the world; when mankind, being wholly illiterate, formed an
idea of religion more suitable to their weak apprehension, and com-
posed their sacred tenets of such tales chiefly as were the objects of
traditional belief, more than of argument or disputation. After the first
alarm, therefore, was over, which arose from the new paradoxes and
principles of the philosophers; these teachers seem ever after, during the
ages of antiquity, to have lived in great harmony with the established
superstition, and to have made a fair partition of mankind between them;
the former claiming all the learned and wise, the latter possessing all the
vulgar and illiterate.
103. It seems then, say I, that you leave politics entirely out of the
question, and never suppose, that a wise magistrate can justly be jealous
of certain tenets of philosophy, such as those of Epicurus, which, deny-
ing a divine existence, and consequently a providence and a future state,
seem to loosen, in a great measure, the ties of morality, and may be
supposed, for that reason, pernicious to the peace of civil society.
I know, replied he, that in fact these persecutions never, in any age,
proceeded from calm reason, or from experience of the pernicious con-
sequences of philosophy; but arose entirely from passion and prejudice.
But what if I should advance farther, and assert, that if Epicurus had
been accused before the people, by any of the sycophants or informers
of those days, he could easily have defended his cause, and proved his
principles of philosophy to be as salutary as those of his adversaries,
who endeavoured, with such zeal, to expose him to the public hatred
and jealousy?
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a topic, and make a speech for Epicurus, which might satisfy, not the
mob of Athens, if you will allow that ancient and polite city to have
contained any mob, but the more philosophical part of his audience,
such as might be supposed capable of comprehending his arguments.
The matter would not be difficult, upon such conditions, replied he:
And if you please, I shall suppose myself Epicurus for a moment, and
make you stand for the Athenian people, and shall deliver you such an
harangue as will fill all the urn with white beans, and leave not a black
one to gratify the malice of my adversaries.
Very well: Pray proceed upon these suppositions.
104. I come hither, O ye Athenians, to justify in your assembly
what I maintained in my school, and I find myself impeached by furious
antagonists, instead of reasoning with calm and dispassionate enquirers.
Your deliberations, which of right should be directed to questions of
public good, and the interest of the commonwealth, are diverted to the
disquisitions of speculative philosophy; and these magnificent, but per-
haps fruitless enquiries, take place of your more familiar but more use-
ful occupations. But so far as in me lies, I will prevent this abuse. We
shall not here dispute concerning the origin and government of worlds.
We shall only enquire how far such questions concern the public inter-
est. And if I can persuade you, that they are entirely indifferent to the
peace of society and security of government, I hope that you will pres-
ently send us back to our schools, there to examine, at leisure, the ques-
tion the most sublime, but at the same time, the most speculative of all
philosophy.
The religious philosophers, not satisfied with the tradition of your
forefathers, and doctrine of your priests (in which I willingly acqui-
esce), indulge a rash curiosity, in trying how far they can establish reli-
gion upon the principles of reason; and they thereby excite, instead of
satisfying, the doubts, which naturally arise from a diligent and scrutinous
enquiry. They paint, in the most magnificent colours, the order, beauty,
and wise arrangement of the universe; and then ask, if such a glorious
display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of
atoms, or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never
sufficiently admire. I shall not examine the justness of this argument. I
shall allow it to be as solid as my antagonists and accusers can desire. It
is sufficient, if I can prove, from this very reasoning, that the question is
entirely speculative, and that, when, in my philosophical disquisitions, I
deny a providence and a future state, I undermine not the foundations of94/David Hume
society, but advance principles, which they themselves, upon their own
topics, if they argue consistently, must allow to be solid and satisfac-
tory.
105. You then, who are my accusers, have acknowledged, that the
chief or sole argument for a divine existence (which I never questioned)
is derived from the order of nature; where there appear such marks of
intelligence and design, that you think it extravagant to assign for its
cause, either chance, or the blind and unguided force of matter. You
allow, that this is an argument drawn from effects to causes. From the
order of the work, you infer, that there must have been project and fore-
thought in the workman. If you cannot make out this point, you allow,
that your conclusion fails; and you pretend not to establish the conclu-
sion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will justify. These
are your concessions. I desire you to mark the consequences.
When we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must pro-
portion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the
cause any qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the ef-
fect. A body of ten ounces raised in any scale may serve as a proof, that
the counterbalancing weight exceeds ten ounces; but can never afford a
reason that it exceeds a hundred, If the cause, assigned for any effect, be
not sufficient to produce it, we must either reject that cause, or add to it
such qualities as will give it a just proportion to the effect. But if we
ascribe to it farther qualities, or affirm it capable of producing other
effects, we can only indulge the licence of conjecture, and arbitrarily
suppose the existence of qualities and energies, without reason or au-
thority.
The same rule holds, whether the cause assigned be brute uncon-
scious matter, or a rational intelligent being. If the cause be known only
by the effect, we never ought to ascribe to it any qualities, beyond what
are precisely requisite to produce the effect: Nor can we, by any rules of
just reasoning, return back from the cause, and infer other effects from
it, beyond those by which alone it is known to us. No one, merely from
the sight of one of Zeuxis’s pictures, could know, that he was also a
statuary or architect, and was an artist no less skilful in stone and marble
than in colours. The talents and taste, displayed in the particular work
before us; these we may safely conclude the workman to be possessed
of. The cause must be proportioned to the effect; and if we exactly and
precisely proportion it, we shall never find in it any qualities, that point
farther, or afford an inference concerning any other design or perfor-Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/95
mance. Such qualities must be somewhat beyond what is merely requi-
site for producing the effect, which we examine.
106. Allowing, therefore, the gods to be the authors of the existence
or order of the universe; it follows, that they possess that precise degree
of power, intelligence, and benevolence, which appears in their work-
manship; but nothing farther can ever be proved, except we call in the
assistance of exaggeration and flattery to supply the defects of argu-
ment and reasoning. So far as the traces of any attributes, at present,
appear, so far may we conclude these attributes to exist. The supposi-
tion of farther attributes is mere hypothesis; much more the supposition,
that, in distant regions of space or periods of time, there has been, or
will be, a more magnificent display of these attributes, and a scheme of
administration more suitable to such imaginary virtues. We can never
be allowed to mount up from the universe, the effect, to Jupiter, the
cause; and then descend downwards, to infer any new effect from that
cause; as if the present effects alone were not entirely worthy of the
glorious attributes, which we ascribe to that deity. The knowledge of the
cause being derived solely from the effect, they must be exactly adjusted
to each other; and the one can never refer to anything further, or be the
foundation of any new inference and conclusion.
You find certain phenomena in nature. You seek a cause or author.
You imagine that you have found him. You afterwards become so
enamoured of this offspring of your brain, that you imagine it impos-
sible, but he must produce something greater and more perfect than the
present scene of things, which is so full of ill and disorder. You forget,
that this superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary,
or at least, without any foundation in reason; and that you have no
ground to ascribe to him any qualities, but what you see he has actually
exerted and displayed in his productions. Let your gods, therefore, O
philosophers, be suited to the present appearances of nature: and pre-
sume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions, in order
to suit them to the attributes, which you so fondly ascribe to your dei-
ties.
107. When priests and poets, supported by your authority, O Athe-
nians, talk of a golden or silver age, which preceded the present state of
vice and miscry, I hear them with attention and with reverence. But
when philosophers, who pretend to neglect authority, and to cultivate
reason, hold the same discourse, I pay them not, I own, the same obse-
quious submission and pious deference. I ask; who carried them into the96/David Hume
celestial regions, who admitted them into the councils of the gods, who
opened to them the book of fate, that they thus rashly affirm, that their
deities have executed, or will execute, any purpose beyond what has
actually appeared? If they tell me, that they have mounted on the steps
or by the gradual ascent of reason, and by drawing inferences from
effects to causes, I still insist, that they have aided the ascent of reason
by the wings of imagination; otherwise they could not thus change their
manner of inference, and argue from causes to effects; presuming, that
a more perfect production than the present world would be more suit-
able to such perfect beings as the gods, and forgetting that they have no
reason to ascribe to these celestial beings any perfection or any attribute,
but what can be found in the present world.
Hence all the fruitless industry to account for the ill appearances of
nature, and save the honour of the gods; while we must acknowledge the
reality of that evil and disorder, with which the world so much abounds.
The obstinate and intractable qualities of matter, we are told, or the
observance of general laws, or some such reason, is the sole cause,
which controlled the power and benevolence of Jupiter, and obliged him
to create mankind and every sensible creature so imperfect and so un-
happy. These attributes then, are, it seems, beforehand, taken for granted,
in their greatest latitude. And upon that supposition, I own that such
conjectures may, perhaps, be admitted as plausible solutions of the ill
phenomena. But still I ask; Why take these attributes for granted, or
why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the
effect? Why torture your brain to justify the course of nature upon sup-
positions, which, for aught you know, may be entirely imaginary, and of
which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature?
The religious hypothesis, therefore, must be considered only as a
particular method of accounting for the visible phenomena of the uni-
verse: but no just reasoner will ever presume to infer from it any single
fact, and alter or add to the phenomena, in any single particular. If you
think, that the appearances of things prove such causes, it is allowable
for you to draw an inference concerning the existence of these causes. In
such complicated and sublime subjects, every one should be indulged in
the liberty of conjecture and argument. But here you ought to rest. If
you come backward, and arguing from your inferred causes, conclude,
that any other fact has existed, or will exist, in the course of nature,
which may serve as a fuller display of particular attributes; I must ad-
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tached to the present subject, and have certainly added something to the
attributes of the cause, beyond what appears in the effect; otherwise you
could never, with tolerable sense or propriety, add anything to the effect,
in order to render it more worthy of the cause.
108. Where, then, is the odiousness of that doctrine, which I teach
in my school, or rather, which I examine in my gardens? Or what do you
find in this whole question, wherein the security of good morals, or the
peace and order of society, is in the least concerned?
I deny a providence, you say, and supreme governor of the world,
who guides the course of events, and punishes the vicious with infamy
and disappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honour and success,
in all their undertakings. But surely, I deny not the course itself of events,
which lies open to every one’s inquiry and examination. I acknowledge,
that, in the present order of things, virtue is attended with more peace of
mind than vice, and meets with a more favourable reception from the
world. I am sensible, that, according to the past experience of mankind,
friendship is the chief joy of human life, and moderation the only source
of tranquillity and happiness. I never balance between the virtuous and
the vicious course of life; but am sensible, that, to a well-disposed mind,
every advantage is on the side of the former. And what can you say
more, allowing all your suppositions and reasonings? You tell me, in-
deed, that this disposition of things proceeds from intelligence and de-
sign. But whatever it proceeds from, the disposition itself, on which
depends our happiness or misery, and consequently our conduct and
deportment in life is still the same. It is still open for me, as well as you,
to regulate my behaviour, by my experience of past events. And if you
affirm, that, while a divine providence is allowed, and a supreme dis-
tributive justice in the universe, I ought to expect some more particular
reward of the good, and punishment of the bad, beyond the ordinary
course of events; I here find the same fallacy, which I have before en-
deavoured to detect. You persist in imagining, that, if we grant that
divine existence, for which you so earnestly contend, you may safely
infer consequences from it, and add something to the experienced order
of nature, by arguing from the attributes which you ascribe to your
gods. You seem not to remember, that all your reasonings on this subject
can only be drawn from effects to causes; and that every argument,
deducted from causes to effects, must of necessity be a gross sophism;
since it is impossible for you to know anything of the cause, but what
you have antecedently, not inferred, but discovered to the full, in the98/David Hume
effect.
109. But what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners,
who, instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object
of their contemplation, so far reverse the whole course of nature, as to
render this life merely a passage to something farther; a porch, which
leads to a greater, and vastly different building; a prologue, which serves
only to introduce the piece, and give it more grace and propriety? Whence,
do you think, can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods? From
their own conceit and imagination surely. For if they derived it from the
present phenomena, it would never point to anything farther, but must
be exactly adjusted to them. That the divinity may possibly be endowed
with attributes, which we have never seen exerted; may be governed by
principles of action, which we cannot discover to be satisfied: all this
will freely be allowed. But still this is mere possibility and hypothesis.
We never can have reason to in infer any attributes, or any principles of
action in him, but so far as we know them to have been exerted and
satisfied.
Are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world? If you
answer in the affirmative, I conclude, that, since justice here exerts it-
self, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I conclude that you have
then no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods. If you
hold a medium between affirmation and negation, by saying, that the
justice of the gods, at present, exerts itself in part, but not in its full
extent; I answer, that you have no reason to give it any particular extent,
but only so far as you see it, at present, exert itself.
110. Thus I bring the dispute, O Athenians, to a short issue with my
antagonists. The course of nature lies open to my contemplation as well
as to theirs. The experienced train of events is the great standard, by
which we all regulate our conduct. Nothing else can be appealed to in
the field, or in the senate. Nothing else ought ever to be heard of in the
school, or in the closet. In vain would our limited understanding break
through those boundaries, which are too narrow for our fond imagina-
tion. While we argue from the course of nature, and infer a particular
intelligent cause, which first bestowed, and still preserves order in the
universe, we embrace a principle, which is both uncertain and useless.
It is uncertain; because the subject lies entirely beyond the reach of
human experience. It is useless; because our knowledge of this cause
being derived entirely from the course of nature, we can never, accord-
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new inference, or making additions to the common and experienced course
of nature, establish any new principles of conduct and behaviour.
111. I observe (said I, finding he had finished his harangue) that you
neglect not the artifice of the demagogues of old; and as you were pleased
to make me stand for the people, you insinuate yourself into my favour
by embracing those principles, to which, you know, I have always ex-
pressed a particular attachment. But allowing you to make experience
(as indeed I think you ought) the only standard of our judgement con-
cerning this, and all other questions of fact; I doubt not but, from the
very same experience, to which you appeal, it may be possible to refute
this reasoning, which you have put into the mouth of Epicurus. If you
saw, for instance, a half-finished building, surrounded with heaps of
brick and stone and mortar, and all the instruments of masonry; could
you not infer from the effect that it was a work of design and contriv-
ance? And could you not return again, from this inferred cause, to infer
new additions to the effect, and conclude, that the building would soon
be finished, and receive all the further improvements, which art could
bestow upon it? If you saw upon the sea-shore the print of one human
foot, you would conclude, that a man had passed that way, and that he
had also left the traces of the other foot, though effaced by the rolling of
the sands or inundation of the waters. Why then do you refuse to admit
the same method of reasoning with regard to the order of nature? Con-
sider the world and the present life only as an imperfect building, from
which you can infer a superior intelligence; and arguing from that supe-
rior intelligence, which can leave nothing imperfect; why may you not
infer a more finished scheme or plan, which will receive its completion
in some distant point of space or time? Are not these methods of reason-
ing exactly similar? And under what pretence can you embrace the one,
while you reject the other?
112. The infinite difference of the subjects, replied he, is a sufficient
foundation for this difference in my conclusions. In works of human art
and contrivance, it is allowable to advance from the effect to the cause,
and returning back from the cause, to form new inferences concerning
the effect, and examine the alterations, which it has probably under-
gone, or may still undergo. But what is the foundation of this method of
reasoning? Plainly this; that man is a being, whom we know by experi-
ence, whose motives and designs we are acquainted with, and whose
projects and inclinations have a certain connexion and coherence, ac-
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such a creature. When, therefore, we find, that any work has proceeded
from the skill and industry of man; as we are otherwise acquainted with
the nature of the animal, we can draw a hundred inferences concerning
what may be expected from him; and these inferences will all be founded
in experience and observation. But did we know man only from the
single work or production which we examine, it were impossible for us
to argue in this manner; because our knowledge of all the qualities,
which we ascribe to him, being in that case derived from the production,
it is impossible they could point to anything farther, or be the foundation
of any new inference. The print of a foot in the sand can only prove,
when considered alone, that there was some figure adapted to it, by
which it was produced: but the print of a human foot proves likewise,
from our other experience, that there was probably another foot, which
also left its impression, though effaced by time or other accidents. Here
we mount from the effect to the cause; and descending again from the
cause, infer alterations in the effect; but this is not a continuation of the
same simple chain of reasoning. We comprehend in this case a hundred
other experiences and observations, concerning the usual figure and
members of that species of animal, without which this method of argu-
ment must be considered as fallacious and sophistical.
113. The case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of
nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a single
being in the universe, not comprehended under any species or genus,
from whose experienced attributes or qualities, we can, by analogy, in-
fer any attribute or quality in him. As the universe shews wisdom and
goodness, we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shews a particular de-
gree of these perfections, we infer a particular degree of them, precisely
adapted to the effect which we examine. But farther attributes or farther
degrees of the same attributes, we can never be authorised to infer or
suppose, by any rules of just reasoning. Now, without some such li-
cence of supposition, it is impossible for us to argue from the cause, or
infer any alteration in the effect, beyond what has immediately fallen
under our observation. Greater good produced by this Being must still
prove a greater degree of goodness: a more impartial distribution of
rewards and punishments must proceed from a greater regard to justice
and equity. Every supposed addition to the works of nature makes an
addition to the attributes of the Author of nature; and consequently,
being entirely unsupported by any reason or argument, can never be
admitted but as mere conjecture and hypothesis.29Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/101
The great source of our mistake in this subject, and of the unbounded
licence of conjecture, which we indulge, is, that we tacitly consider our-
selves, as in the place of the Supreme Being, and conclude, that he will,
on every occasion, observe the same conduct, which we ourselves, in
his situation, would have embraced as reasonable and eligible. But, be-
sides that the ordinary course of nature may convince us, that almost
everything is regulated by principles and maxims very different from
ours; besides this, I say, it must evidently appear contrary to all rules of
analogy to reason, from the intentions and projects of men, to those of a
Being so different, and so much superior. In human nature, there is a
certain experienced coherence of designs and inclinations; so that when,
from any fact, we have discovered one intention of any man, it may
often be reasonable, from experience, to infer another, and draw a long
chain of conclusions concerning his past or future conduct. But this
method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a Being, so
remote and incomprehensible, who bears much less analogy to any other
being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper, and who discovers
himself only by some faint traces or outlines, beyond which we have no
authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection. What we imagine
to be a superior perfection, may really be a defect. Or were it ever so
much a perfection, the ascribing of it to the Supreme Being, where it
appears not to have been really exerted, to the full, in his works, savours
more of flattery and panegyric, than of just reasoning and sound phi-
losophy. All the philosophy, therefore, in the world, and all the religion,
which is nothing but a species of philosophy, will never be able to carry
us beyond the usual course of experience, or give us measures of con-
duct and behaviour different from those which are furnished by reflec-
tions on common life. No new fact can ever be inferred from the reli-
gious hypothesis; no event foreseen or foretold; no reward or punish-
ment expected or dreaded, beyond what is already known by practice
and observation. So that my apology for Epicurus will still appear solid
and satisfactory; nor have the political interests of society any connexion
with the philosophical disputes concerning metaphysics and religion.
114. There is still one circumstance, replied I, which you seem to
have overlooked. Though I should allow your premises, I must deny
your conclusion. You conclude, that religious doctrines and reasonings
can have no influence on life, because they ought to have no influence;
never considering, that men reason not in the same manner you do, but
draw many consequences from the belief of a divine Existence, and102/David Hume
suppose that the Deity will inflict punishments on vice, and bestow re-
wards on virtue, beyond what appear in the ordinary course of nature.
Whether this reasoning of theirs be just or not, is no matter. Its influence
on their life and conduct must still be the same. And, those, who attempt
to disabuse them of such prejudices, may, for aught I know, be good
reasoners, but I cannot allow them to be good citizens and politicians;
since they free men from one restraint upon their passions, and make the
infringement of the laws of society, in one respect, more easy and se-
cure.
After all, I may, perhaps, agree to your general conclusion in favour
of liberty, though upon different premises from those, on which you
endeavour to found it. I think, that the state ought to tolerate every
principle of philosophy; nor is there an instance, that any government
has suffered in its political interests by such indulgence. There is no
enthusiasm among philosophers; their doctrines are not very alluring to
the people; and no restraint can be put upon their reasonings, but what
must be of dangerous consequence to the sciences, and even to the state,
by paving the way for persecution and oppression in points, where the
generality of mankind are more deeply interested and concerned.
115. But there occurs to me (continued I) with regard to your main
topic, a difficulty, which I shall just propose to you without insisting on
it; lest it lead into reasonings of too nice and delicate a nature. In a word,
I much doubt whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its
effect (as you have all along supposed) or to be of so singular and par-
ticular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other
cause or object, that has ever fallen under our observation. It is only
when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined, that
we can infer the one from the other; and were an effect presented, which
was entirely singular, and could not be comprehended under any known
species, I do not see that we could form any conjecture or inference at
all concerning its cause. If experience and observation and analogy be,
indeed, the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of
this nature; both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and resem-
blance to other effects and causes, which we know, and which we have
found, in many instances, to be conjoined with each other. I leave it to
your own reflection to pursue the consequences of this principle. I shall
just observe, that, as the antagonists of Epicurus always suppose the
universe, an effect quite singular and unparalleled, to be the proof of a
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that supposition, seem, at least, to merit our attention. There is, I own,
some difficulty, how we can ever return from the cause to the effect,
and, reasoning from our ideas of the former, infer any alteration on the
latter, or any addition to it.
Sect. XII. Of the academical or sceptical
Philosophy
Part I.
116. There is not a greater number of philosophical reasonings, dis-
played upon any subject, than those, which prove the existence of a
Deity, and refute the fallacies of Atheists; and yet the most religious
philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded as to be a
speculative atheist. How shall we reconcile these contradictions? The
knights-errant, who wandered about to clear the world of dragons and
giants, never entertained the least doubt with regard to the existence of
these monsters.
The Sceptic is another enemy of religion, who naturally provokes
the indignation of all divines and graver philosophers; though it is cer-
tain, that no man ever met with any such absurd creature, or conversed
with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any subject,
either of action or speculation. This begets a very natural question; What
is meant by a sceptic? And how far it is possible to push these philo-
sophical principles of doubt and uncertainty?
There is a species of scepticism, antecedent to all study and phi-
losophy, which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a sover-
eign preservative against error and precipitate judgement. It recommends
an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles,
but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they, we must
assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some original
principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful. But neither
is there any such original principle which has a prerogative above oth-
ers, that are self-evident and convincing: or if there were, could we ad-
vance a step beyond it, but by the use of those very faculties, of which
we are supposed to be already diffident. The Cartesian doubt, therefore,
were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly
is not) would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us
to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject.
It must, however, be confessed, that this species of scepticism, when104/David Hume
more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense, and is a
necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by preserving a proper
impartiality in our judgements, and weaning our mind from all those
prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or rash opin-
ion. To begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timo-
rous and sure steps, to review frequently our conclusions, and examine
accurately all their consequences; though by these means we shall make
both a slow and a short progress in our systems; are the only methods,
by which we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability
and certainty in our determinations.
117. There is another species of scepticism, consequent to science
and enquiry, when men are supposed to have discovered, either the ab-
solute fallaciousness of their mental faculties, or their unfitness to reach
any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation, about
which they are commonly employed. Even our very senses are brought
into dispute, by a certain species of philosophers; and the maxims of
common life are subjected to the same doubt as the most profound prin-
ciples or conclusions of metaphysics and theology. As these paradoxi-
cal tenets (if they may be called tenets) are to be met with in some
philosophers, and the refutation of them in several, they naturally excite
our curiosity, and make us enquire into the arguments, on which they
may be founded.
I need not insist upon the more trite topics, employed by the sceptics
in all ages, against the evidence of sense; such as those which are de-
rived from the imperfection and fallaciousness of our organs, on num-
berless occasions; the crooked appearance of an oar in water; the vari-
ous aspects of objects, according to their different distances; the double
images which arise from the pressing one eye; with many other appear-
ances of a like nature. These sceptical topics, indeed, are only sufficient
to prove, that the senses alone are not implicitly to be depended on; but
that we must correct their evidence by reason, and by considerations,
derived from the nature of the medium, the distance of the object, and
the disposition of the organ, in order to render them, within their sphere,
the proper criteria of truth and falsehood. There are other more pro-
found arguments against the senses, which admit not of so easy a solu-
tion.
118. It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or
prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any rea-
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external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would ex-
ist, though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated.
Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preserve
this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions.
It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful
instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by
the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion,
that the one are nothing but representations of the other. This very table
which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, inde-
pendent of our perception, and to be something external to our mind,
which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it: our absence
does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform and entire, inde-
pendent of the situation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contem-
plate it.
But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed
by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be
present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are
only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being
able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the
object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove far-
ther from it: but the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no
alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to
the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who
reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we
say, this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind,
and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which remain
uniform and independent.
119. So far, then, are we necessitated by reasoning to contradict or
depart from the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a new sys-
tem with regard to the evidence of our senses. But here philosophy finds
herself extremely embarrassed, when she would justify this new system,
and obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics. She can no longer
plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature: for that led us to a
quite different system, which is acknowledged fallible and even errone-
ous. And to justify this pretended philosophical system, by a chain of
clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of argument,
exceeds the power of all human capacity.
By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind
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resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the
energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and
unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us? It
is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from
anything external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And noth-
ing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body should so
operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance,
supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature.
It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be
produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question
be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like
nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has
never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly
reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition
of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.
120. To have recourse to the veracity of the Supreme Being, in
order to prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unex-
pected circuit. If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter, our
senses would be entirely infallible; because it is not possible that he can
ever deceive. Not to mention, that, if the external world be once called in
question, we shall be at a loss to find arguments, by which we may
prove the existence of that Being or any of his attributes.
121. This is a topic, therefore, in which the profounder and more
philosophical sceptics will always triumph, when they endeavour to in-
troduce an universal doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and
enquiry. Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may
they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to
believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object.
Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational
opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something ex-
ternal? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvi-
ous sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can
never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the
perceptions are connected with any external objects.
122. There is another sceptical topic of a like nature, derived from
the most profound philosophy; which might merit our attention, were it
requisite to dive so deep, in order to discover arguments and reasonings,
which can so little serve to any serious purpose. It is universally al-
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such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c. are merely secondary,
and exist not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind,
without any external archetype or model, which they represent. If this
be allowed, with regard to secondary qualities, it must also follow, with
regard to the supposed primary qualities of extension and solidity; nor
can the latter be any more entitled to that denomination than the former.
The idea of extension is entirely acquired from the senses of sight and
feeling; and if all the qualities, perceived by the senses, be in the mind,
not in the object, the same conclusion must reach the idea of extension
which is wholly dependent on the sensible ideas or the ideas of second-
ary qualities. Nothing can save us from this conclusion, but the assert-
ing, that the ideas of those primary qualities are attained by Abstrac-
tion, an opinion, which, if we examine it accurately, we shall find to be
unintelligible, and even absurd. An extension, that is neither tangible
nor visible, cannot possibly be conceived: and a tangible or visible ex-
tension, which is neither hard nor soft, black nor white, is equally be-
yond the reach of human conception. Let any man try to conceive a
triangle in general, which is neither Isosceles nor Scalenum, nor has any
particular length or proportion of sides; and he will soon perceive the
absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and
general ideas.30
123. Thus the first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense
or to the opinion of external existence consists in this, that such an
opinion, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and if re-
ferred to reason, is contrary to natural instinct, and at the same time
carries no rational evidence with it, to convince an impartial enquirer.
The second objection goes farther, and represents this opinion as con-
trary to reason: at least, if it be a principle of reason, that all sensible
qualities are in the mind, not in the object. Bereave matter of all its
intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner anni-
hilate it, and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something, as
the cause of our perceptions; a notion so imperfect, that no sceptic will
think it worth while to contend against it.
Part II.
124. It may seem a very extravagant attempt of the sceptics to destroy
reason by argument and ratiocination; yet is this the grand scope of all
their enquiries and disputes. They endeavour to find objections, both to
our abstract reasonings, and to those which regard matter of fact and108/David Hume
existence.
The chief objection against all abstract reasonings is derived from
the ideas of space and time; ideas, which, in common life and to a care-
less view, are very clear and intelligible, but when they pass through the
scrutiny of the profound sciences (and they are the chief object of these
sciences) afford principles, which seem full of absurdity and contradic-
tion. No priestly dogmas, invented on purpose to tame and subdue the
rebellious reason of mankind, ever shocked common sense more than
the doctrine of the infinitive divisibility of extension, with its conse-
quences; as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians and
metaphysicians, with a kind of triumph and exultation. A real quantity,
infinitely less than any finite quantity, containing quantities infinitely
less than itself, and so on in infinitum; this is an edifice so bold and
prodigious, that it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration to
support, because it shocks the clearest and most natural principles of
human reason.31 But what renders the matter more extraordinary, is,
that these seemingly absurd opinions are supported by a chain of rea-
soning, the clearest and most natural; nor is it possible for us to allow
the premises without admitting the consequences. Nothing can be more
convincing and satisfactory than all the conclusions concerning the prop-
erties of circles and triangles; and yet, when these are once received,
how can we deny, that the angle of contact between a circle and its
tangent is infinitely less than any rectilineal angle, that as you may in-
crease the diameter of the circle in infinitum, this angle of contact be-
comes still less, even in infinitum, and that the angle of contact between
other curves and their tangents may be infinitely less than those between
any circle and its tangent, and so on, in infinitum? The demonstration of
these principles seems as unexceptionable as that which proves the three
angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, though the latter opin-
ion be natural and easy, and the former big with contradiction and ab-
surdity. Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and
suspence, which, without the suggestions of any sceptic, gives her a
diffidence of herself, and of the ground on which she treads. She sees a
full light, which illuminates certain places; but that light borders upon
the most profound darkness. And between these she is so dazzled and
confounded, that she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and assur-
ance concerning any one object.
125. The absurdity of these bold determinations of the abstract sci-
ences seems to become, if possible, still more palpable with regard toEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/109
time than extension. An infinite number of real parts of time, passing in
succession, and exhausted one after another, appears so evident a con-
tradiction, that no man, one should think, whose judgement is not cor-
rupted, instead of being improved, by the sciences, would ever be able
to admit of it.
Yet still reason must remain restless, and unquiet, even with regard
to that scepticism, to which she is driven by these seeming absurdities
and contradictions. How any clear, distinct idea can contain circum-
stances, contradictory to itself, or to any other clear, distinct idea, is
absolutely incomprehensible; and is, perhaps, as absurd as any proposi-
tion, which can be formed. So that nothing can be more sceptical, or
more full of doubt and hesitation, than this scepticism itself, which arises
from some of the paradoxical conclusions of geometry or the science of
quantity.32
126. The sceptical objections to moral evidence, or to the reason-
ings concerning matter of fact, are either popular or philosophical. The
popular objections are derived from the natural weakness of human
understanding; the contradictory opinions, which have been entertained
in different ages and nations; the variations of our judgement in sickness
and health, youth and old age, prosperity and adversity; the perpetual
contradiction of each particular man’s opinions and sentiments; with
many other topics of that kind. It is needless to insist farther on this
head. These objections are but weak. For as, in common life, we reason
every moment concerning fact and existence, and cannot possibly sub-
sist, without continually employing this species of argument, any popu-
lar objections, derived from thence, must be insufficient to destroy that
evidence. The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles
of scepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of com-
mon life. These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools; where
it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as
they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real objects, which
actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition to the more
powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the
most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals.
127. The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper sphere,
and display those philosophical objections, which arise from more pro-
found researches. Here he seems to have ample matter of triumph; while
he justly insists, that all our evidence for any matter of fact, which lies
beyond the testimony of sense or memory, is derived entirely from the110/David Hume
relation of cause and effect; that we have no other idea of this relation
than that of two objects, which have been frequently conjoined together;
that we have no argument to convince us, that objects, which have, in
our experience, been frequently conjoined, will likewise, in other in-
stances, be conjoined in the same manner; and that nothing leads us to
this inference but custom or a certain instinct of our nature; which it is
indeed difficult to resist, but which, like other instincts, may be falla-
cious and deceitful. While the sceptic insists upon these topics, he shows
his force, or rather, indeed, his own and our weakness; and seems, for
the time at least, to destroy all assurance and conviction. These argu-
ments might be displayed at greater length, if any durable good or ben-
efit to society could ever be expected to result from them.
128. For here is the chief and most confounding objection to exces-
sive scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it; while it
remains in its full force and vigour. We need only ask such a sceptic,
What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious re-
searches? He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer. A
Copernican or Ptolemaic, who supports each his different system of
astronomy, may hope to produce a conviction, which will remain con-
stant and durable, with his audience. A Stoic or Epicurean displays
principles, which may not be durable, but which have an effect on con-
duct and behaviour. But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philoso-
phy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had, that its
influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must ac-
knowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must
perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All dis-
course, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total
lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their
miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded.
Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a Pyrrhonian may
throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by
his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put
to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every
point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other
sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophi-
cal researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to
join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections
are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the
whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe;Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/111
though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy them-
selves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the
objections, which may be raised against them.
Part III.
129. There is, indeed, a more mitigated scepticism or academical phi-
losophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part,
be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its un-
distinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense
and reflection. The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affir-
mative and dogmatical in their opinions; and while they see objects only
on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising argument, they
throw themselves precipitately into the principles, to which they are
inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those who entertain opposite
sentiments. To hesitate or balance perplexes their understanding, checks
their passion, and suspends their action. They are, therefore, impatient
till they escape from a state, which to them is so uneasy: and they think,
that they could never remove themselves far enough from it, by the
violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of their belief. But could
such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of
human understanding, even in its most perfect state, and when most
accurate and cautious in its determinations; such a reflection would natu-
rally inspire them with more modesty and reserve, and diminish their
fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice against antagonists. The
illiterate may reflect on the disposition of the learned, who, amidst all
the advantages of study and reflection, are commonly still diffident in
their determinations: and if any of the learned be inclined, from their
natural temper, to haughtiness and obstinacy, a small tincture of
Pyrrhonism might abate their pride, by showing them, that the few ad-
vantages, which they may have attained over their fellows, are but in-
considerable, if compared with the universal perplexity and confusion,
which is inherent in human nature. In general, there is a degree of doubt,
and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision,
ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner.
130. Another species of mitigated scepticism which may be of ad-
vantage to mankind, and which may be the natural result of the Pyrrhonian
doubts and scruples, is the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects
as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding. The
imagination of man is naturally sublime, delighted with whatever is re-112/David Hume
mote and extraordinary, and running, without control, into the most dis-
tant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects, which custom
has rendered too familiar to it. A correct Judgement observes a contrary
method, and avoiding all distant and high enquiries, confines itself to
common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and expe-
rience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of poets
and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians. To bring us to so
salutary a determination, nothing can be more serviceable, than to be
once thoroughly convinced of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt, and of
the impossibility, that anything, but the strong power of natural instinct,
could free us from it. Those who have a propensity to philosophy, will
still continue their researches; because they reflect, that, besides the
immediate pleasure, attending such an occupation, philosophical deci-
sions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and
corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life, so
long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which they
employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations. While we
cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we believe, after a thousand ex-
periments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn; can we ever satisfy our-
selves concerning any determination, which we may form, with regard
to the origin of worlds, and the situation of nature, from, and to eter-
nity?
This narrow limitation, indeed, of our enquiries, is, in every re-
spect, so reasonable, that it suffices to make the slightest examination
into the natural powers of the human mind and to compare them with
their objects, in order to recommend it to us. We shall then find what are
the proper subjects of science and enquiry.
131. It seems to me, that the only objects of the abstract science or
of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to ex-
tend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are
mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and
number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved;
and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a
variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different
appearances. But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different
from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny,
than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce
one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these deci-
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which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the
hypothenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides, cannot be
known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of rea-
soning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where
there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to
define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This
proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the
same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may
be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quan-
tity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only
proper objects of knowledge and demonstration.
132. All other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and exist-
ence; and these are evidently incapable of demonstration. Whatever is
may not be. No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. The non-
existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and distinct an
idea as its existence. The proposition, which affirms it not to be, how-
ever false, is no less conceivable and intelligible, than that which af-
firms it to be. The case is different with the sciences, properly so called.
Every proposition, which is not true, is there confused and unintelli-
gible. That the cube root of 64 is equal to the half of 10, is a false
proposition, and can never be distinctly conceived. But that Caesar, or
the angel Gabriel, or any being never existed, may be a false proposi-
tion, but still is perfectly conceivable, and implies no contradiction.
The existence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by argu-
ments from its cause or its effect; and these arguments are founded en-
tirely on experience. If we reason a priori, anything may appear able to
produce anything. The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know,
extinguish the sun; or the wish of a man control the planets in their
orbits. It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of
cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from
that of another.33 Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms
the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of all human
action and behaviour.
Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts.
All deliberations in life regard the former; as also all disquisitions in
history, chronology, geography, and astronomy.
The sciences, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural phi-
losophy, physic, chemistry, &c. where the qualities, causes and effects
of a whole species of objects are enquired into.114/David Hume
Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the
immortality of souls, is composed partly of reasonings concerning par-
ticular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in reason, so
far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid founda-
tion is faith and divine revelation.
Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understand-
ing as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt,
more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and en-
deavor to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general
tastes of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of rea-
soning and enquiry.
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what
havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or
school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any ab-
stract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain
any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?




1. It is probable that no more was meant by those, who denied innate
ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impressions; though it
must be confessed, that the terms, which they employed, were not
chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined, as to prevent all
mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by innate? If innate
be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the
mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever sense we
take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is uncommon,
artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant, contemporary to our
birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to en-
quire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our
birth. Again, the word idea, seems to be commonly taken in a very
loose sense, by Locke and others; as standing for any of our percep-
tions, our sensations and passions, as well as thoughts. Now in this
sense, I should desire to know, what can be meant by asserting, that




4. Cause and effect.
5. For instance Contrast or Contrariety is also a connexion among Ideas:
but it may, perhaps, be considered as a mixture of Causation and
Resemblance. Where two objects are contrary, the one destroys the
other; that is, the cause of its annihilation, and the idea of the annihi-
lation of an object, implies the idea of its former existence.
6. The word, Power, is here used in a loose and popular sense. The more
accurate explication of it would give additional evidence to this argu-
ment. See Sect. 7.
7. Nothing is more useful than for writers, even, on moral, political, or
physical subjects, to distinguish between reason and experience, and
to suppose, that these species of argumentation are entirely different
from each other. The former are taken for the mere result of our
intellectual faculties, which, by considering priori the nature of things,
and examining the effects, that must follow from their operation, es-
tablish particular principles of science and philosophy. The latter are
supposed to be derived entirely from sense and observation, by which
we learn what has actually resulted from the operation of particular
objects, and are thence able to infer, what will, for the future, result
from them. Thus, for instance, the limitations and restraints of civil
government, and a legal constitution, may be defended, either from
reason, which reflecting on the great frailty and corruption of human
nature, teaches, that no man can safely be trusted with unlimited
authority; or from experience and history, which inform us of the
enormous abuses, that ambition, in every age and country, has been
found to make of so imprudent a confidence.
8. “Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an errore quodam, ut, cum ea
loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum
esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam siquando eorum ipsorum aut
facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod legamus? Velut ego nunc moveor.
Venit enim mihi Plato in mentem, quem accepimus primum hic
disputare solitum: cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui non memoriam
solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo hic ponere.
Hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo; cuius ipsa
illa sessio fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram,
Hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quae mihi minor esse videtur116/David Hume
postquam est maior, solebam intuens, Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium,
nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis est in
locis; ut non sine causa ex his memoriae deducta sit disciplina.”
Cicero, De finibus, Book V.
9. Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In
this view, we must say, that it is only probable all men must die, or
that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform our language more
to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations,
proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning such arguments from
experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition.
10. Section II.
11. Mr. Locke, in his chapter of power, says that, finding from experi-
ence, that there are several new productions in matter, and conclud-
ing that there must somewhere be a power capable of producing them,
we arrive at last by this reasoning at the idea of power. But no rea-
soning can ever give us a new, original, simple idea; as this philoso-
pher himself confesses. This, therefore, can never be the origin of
that idea.
12. It may be pretended, that the resistance which we meet with in bod-
ies, obliging us frequently to exert our force, and call up all our power,
this gives us the idea of force and power. It is this nisus, or strong
endeavour, of which we are conscious, that is the original impression
from which this idea is copied. But, first, we attribute power to a vast
number of objects, where we never can suppose this resistance of
exertion of force to take place; to the Supreme Being, who never
meets with any resistance; to the mind in its command over its ideas
and limbs, in common thinking and motion, where the effect follows
immediately upon the will, without any exertion or summoning up of
force; to inanimate matter, which is not capable of this sentiment.
Secondly, This sentiment of an endeavour to overcome resistance has
no known connexion with any event: What follows it, we know by
experience; but could not know it a priori. It must, however, be con-
fessed, that the animal nisus, which we experience, though it can
afford no accurate precise idea of power, enters very much into that
vulgar, inaccurate idea, which is formed of it.
13. Theos apo mechanes (deus ex machina).
14. Section XII.
15. I need not examine at length the vis inertiae which is so much talked
of in the new philosophy, and which is ascribed to matter. We find byEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/117
experience, that a body at rest or in motion continues for ever in its
present state, till put from it by some new cause; and that a body
impelled takes as much motion from the impelling body as it acquires
itself. These are facts. When we call this a vis inertiae, we only mark
these facts, without pretending to have any idea of the inert power; in
the same manner as, when we talk of gravity, we mean certain ef-
fects, without comprehending that active power. It was never the
meaning of Sir Isaac Newton to rob second causes of all force or
energy; though some of his followers have endeavoured to establish
that theory upon his authority. On the contrary, that great philoso-
pher had recourse to an etherial active fluid to explain his universal
attraction; though he was so cautious and modest as to allow, that it
was a mere hypothesis, not to be insisted on, without more experi-
ments. I must confess, that there is something in the fate of opinions
a little extraordinary. Descartes insinuated that doctrine of the uni-
versal and sole efficacy of the Deity, without insisting on it.
Malebranche and other Cartesians made it the foundation of all their
philosophy. It had, however, no authority in England. Locke, Clarke,
and Cudworth, never so much as take notice of it, but suppose all
along, that matter has a real, though subordinate and derived power.
By what means has it become so prevalent among our modern meta-
physicians?
16. According to these explications and definitions, the idea of power is
relative as much as that of cause; and both have a reference to an
effect, or some other event constantly conjoined with the former. When
we consider the unknown circumstance of an object, by which the
degree or quantity of its effect is fixed and determined, we call that its
power: And accordingly, it is allowed by all philosophers, that the
effect is the measure of the power. But if they had any idea of power,
as it is in itself, why could not they Measure it in itself? The dispute
whether the force of a body in motion be as its velocity, or the square
of its velocity; this dispute, I say, need not be decided by comparing
its effects in equal or unequal times; but by a direct mensuration and
comparison.
17. The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for, from
another cause, viz., a false sensation or seeming experience which we
have, or may have, of liberty or indifference, in many of our actions.
The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of mind, is not,
properly speaking, a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intel-118/David Hume
ligent being, who may consider the action; and it consists chiefly in
the determination of his thoughts to infer the existence of that action
from some preceding objects; as liberty, when opposed to necessity,
is nothing but the want of that determination, and a certain looseness
or indifference, which we feel, in passing, or not passing, from the
idea of one object to that of any succeeding one. Now we may ob-
serve, that, though, in reflecting on human actions, we seldom feel
such a looseness, or indifference, but are commonly able to infer
them with considerable certainty from their motives, and from the
dispositions of the agent; yet it frequently happens, that, in perform-
ing the actions themselves, we are sensible of something like it: And
as all resembling objects are readily taken for each other, this has
been employed as a demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human
liberty. We feel, that our actions are subject to our will, on most
occasions; and imagine we feel, that the will itself is subject to noth-
ing, because, when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel,
that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself (or a
Velleity, as it is called in the schools) even on that side, on which it
did not settle. This image, or faint motion, we persuade ourselves,
could, at that time, have been compleated into the thing itself; be-
cause, should that be denied, we find, upon a second trial, that, at
present, it can. We consider not, that the fantastical desire of shewing
liberty, is here the motive of our actions. And it seems certain, that,
however we may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a specta-
tor can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character;
and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might,
were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situa-
tion and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and
disposition. Now this is the very essence of necessity, according to
the foregoing doctrine.
18. Thus, if a cause be defined, that which produces any thing; it is easy
to observe, that producing is synonimous to causing. In like manner,
if a cause be defined, that by which any thing exists; this is liable to
the same objection. For what is meant by these words, by which?
Had it been said, that a cause is that after which any thing constantly
exists; we should have understood the terms. For this is, indeed, all
we know of the matter. And this constancy forms the very essence of
necessity, nor have we any other idea of it.
19. Since all reasonings concerning facts or causes is derived merelyEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding/119
from custom, it may be asked how it happens, that men so much
surpass animals in reasoning, and one man so much surpasses an-
other? Has not the same custom the same influence on all?
20. Plutarch, Marcus Cato.
21. No Indian, it is evident, could have experience that water did not
freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a situation quite
unknown to him; and it is impossible for him to tell a priori what will
result from it. It is making a new experiment, the consequence of
which is always uncertain. One may sometimes conjecture from anal-
ogy what will follow; but still this is but conjecture. And it must be
confessed, that, in the present case of freezing, the event follows con-
trary to the rules of analogy, and is such as a rational Indian would
not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual, ac-
cording to the degrees of cold; but whenever it comes to the freezing
point, the water passes in a moment, from the utmost liquidity to
perfect hardness. Such an event, therefore, may be denominated ex-
traordinary, and requires a pretty strong testimony to render it cred-
ible to people in a war climate: But still it is not miraculous, nor
contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where
all the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of Sumatra have
always seen water fluid in their own climate, and the freezing of their
rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they never saw water in
Muscovy during the winter; and therefore they cannot reasonably be
positive what would there be the consequence.
22. Sometimes an event may not, in itself, seem to be contrary to the
laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reason of some
circumstances, be denominated a miracle; because, in fact, it is con-
trary to these laws. Thus if a person, claiming a divine authority,
should command a sick person to be well, a healthful man to fall
down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in short, should
order many natural events, which immediately follow upon his com-
mand; these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are re-
ally, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any suspicion
remain, that the event and command concurred by accident, there is
no miracle and no transgression of the laws of nature. If this suspi-
cion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a transgression of
these laws; because nothing can be more contrary to nature than that
the voice or command of a man should have such an influence. A
miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature120/David Hume
by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some
invisible agent. A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not.
This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of a house or ship
into the air is a visible miracle. The raising of a feather, when the
wind wants ever so little of a force requisite for that purpose, is as
real a miracle, though not so sensible with regard to us.
23. Histories, iv. 81. Suetonius gives nearly the same account, Lives of
the Caesars (Vespasian).
24. Lucretius.
25. Novum Organum, II, aph. 29.
26. Lucian, sump. e Lapithai [The Banquet, or the Lapiths]
27. Lucian, eunouchos [The Eunuch].
28. Lucian and Dio.
29. In general, it may, I think, be established as a maxim, that where any
cause is known only by its particular effects, it must be impossible to
infer any new effects from that cause; since the qualities, which are
requisite to produce these new effects along with the former, must
either be different, or superior, or of more extensive operation, than
those which simply produced the effect, whence alone the cause is
supposed to be known to us. We can never, therefore, have any rea-
son to suppose the existence of these qualities. To say, that the new
effects proceed only from a continuation of the same energy, which is
already known from the first effects, will not remove the difficulty.
For even granting this to be the case (which can seldom be supposed),
the very continuation and exertion of a like energy (for it is impos-
sible it can be absolutely the same), I say, this exertion of a like
energy, in a different period of space and time, is a very arbitrary
supposition, and what there cannot possibly be any traces of in the
effects, from which all our knowledge of the cause is originally de-
rived. Let the inferred cause be exactly proportioned (as it should be)
to the known effect; and it is impossible that it can possess any quali-
ties, from which new or different effects can be inferred.
30. This argument is drawn from Dr. Berkeley; and indeed most of the
writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scep-
ticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern
philosophers, Bayle not excepted. He professes, however, in his title
page (and undoubtedly with great truth) to have composed his book
against the sceptics as well as against the atheists and free-thinkers.
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merely sceptical, appears from this, that they admit of no answer and
produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary
amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scep-
ticism.
31. Whatever disputes there may be about mathematical points, we must
allow that there are physical points; that is, parts of extension, which
cannot be divided or lessened, either by the eye or imagination. These
images, then, which are present to the fancy or senses, are absolutely
indivisible, and consequently must be allowed by mathematicians to
be infinitely less than any real part of extension; and yet nothing
appears more certain to reason, than that an infinite number of them
composes an infinite extension. How much more an infinite number
of those infinitely small parts of extension, which are still supposed
infinitely divisible.
32. It seems to me not impossible to avoid these absurdities and contradic-
tions, if it be admitted, that there is no such thing as abstract or general
ideas, properly speaking; but that all general ideas are, in reality, par-
ticular ones, attached to a general term, which recalls, upon occasion,
other particular ones, that resemble, in certain circumstances, the idea,
present to the mind. Thus when the term Horse is pronounced, we imme-
diately figure to ourselves the idea of a black or a white animal, of a
particular size or figure: But as that term is also usually applied to ani-
mals of other colours, figures and sizes, these ideas, though not actually
present to the imagination, are easily recalled; and our reasoning and
conclusion proceed in the same way, as if they were actually present. If
this be admitted (as seems reasonable) it follows that all the ideas of
quantity, upon which mathematicians reason, are nothing but particular,
and such as are suggested by the senses and imagination, and conse-
quently, cannot be infinitely divisible. It is sufficient to have dropped this
hint at present, without prosecuting it any farther. It certainly concerns
all lovers of science not to expose themselves to the ridicule and con-
tempt of the ignorant by their conclusions; and this seems the readiest
solution of these difficulties.
33.  That impious maxim of the ancient philosophy, Ex nihilo, nihil fit, by
which the creation of matter was excluded, ceases to be a maxim, ac-
cording to this philosophy. Not only the will of the supreme Being may
create matter; but, for aught we know a priori, the will of any other being
might create it, or any other cause, that the most whimsical imagination
can assign.